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Abstract
The Moving Target Defense (MTD) concept has been proposed as an approach to rebal-
ance the security landscape by increasing uncertainty and apparent complexity for attackers,
reducing their window of opportunity, and raising the costs of their reconnaissance and at-
tack efforts. Intuitively, the idea of applying MTD techniques to a whole IT system should
provide enhanced security; however, little research has been done to show that it is feasible
or beneficial to the system’s security.
This dissertation presents an MTD platform at the whole IT system level in which any
component of the IT system can be automatically and reliably replaced with a fresh new
one. A component is simply a virtual machine (VM) instance or a cluster of instances.
There are a number of security benefits when leveraging such an MTD platform. Re-
placing a VM instance with a new one with the most up-to-date operating system and
applications eliminates security problems caused by unpatched vulnerabilities and all the
privileges the attacker has obtained on the old instance. Configuration parameters for the
new instance, such as IP address, port numbers for services, and credentials, can be changed
from the old ones, invalidating the knowledge the attackers already obtained and forcing
them to redo the work to re-compromise the new instance.
In spite of these obvious security benefits, building a system that supports live replace-
ment with minimal to no disruption to the IT system’s normal operations is difficult. Modern
enterprise IT systems have complex dependencies among services so that changing even a
single instance will almost certainly disrupt the dependent services. Therefore, the replace-
ment of instances must be carefully orchestrated with updating the settings of the dependent
instances. This orchestration of changes is notoriously error-prone if done manually, however,
limited tool support is available to automate this process.
We designed and built a framework (ANCOR) that captures the requirements and needs
of a whole IT system (in particular, dependencies among various services) and compiles
them into a working IT system. ANCOR is at the core of the proposed MTD platform
(ANCOR-MTD) and enables automated live instance replacements. In order to evaluate
the platform’s practicality, this dissertation presents a series of experiments on multiple IT
systems that show negligible (statistically non-significant) performance impacts. To evaluate
the platform’s efficacy, this research analyzes costs versus security benefits by quantifying
the outcome (sizes of potential attack windows) in terms of the number of adaptations, and
demonstrates that an IT system deployed and managed using the proposed MTD platform
will increase attack difficulty.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The static nature of current Information Technology (IT) systems gives attackers the ex-
tremely valuable advantage of time, as adversaries are able to plan attacks at their leisure.2
Therefore, a promising new approach to cyber security, called Moving Target Defense or
MTD,2;3 has emerged as a potential solution. The core idea of MTD is to make a system
change proactively as a means to eliminating the asymmetric advantage the attacker has on
time. MTD-related research efforts have included randomizing IP addresses,4–6 executable
codes,7;8 and machine instruction sets,9;10 which help achieve the overall goal of moving tar-
get defense. These efforts, however, focus on specific aspects of a system (i.e., IP addresses,
code for specific applications, and architecture of individual computers) MTD application.
Only limited research has studied how to apply the MTD idea to a whole IT system.
We are viewing a whole IT system as a subset (component) of an enterprise network,
a group of one or more machines (physical or virtual) that work together to fulfill a goal.
The overall goal and scope of a whole IT system are determined by the system engineer/ad-
ministrator and can range from a one-machine service (e.g., FTP server) to more complex
deployments such as multi-host eCommerce websites and Hadoop setups.
Applying the MTD idea at the whole IT system level is highly important for two reasons.
First, system administrators continually struggle to monitor their IT systems for possible
intrusions and compromises, patch potential vulnerabilities, maintain user access lists, or
1
modify firewall rules. The complexity of such IT systems and the time required to maintain
them allow errors to creep into system configurations and create security holes. Creating an
MTD mechanism for the whole IT system will support automation of those configuration
tasks and reduce the chance for errors. Second, due to the complexity and error-proneness
in configuring and maintaining a large IT system, system administrators are generally re-
luctant to change the system setups once they are deployed. The stagnant nature of the
configuration used in the IT system gives adversaries chances to discover security holes, find
opportunities to exploit them, gain/escalate privileges, and maintain persistent presence over
time.11 Introducing MTD mechanisms on the whole IT system’s configuration will limit or
eliminate this advantage.
While it sounds promising, little research has been done to show that MTD systems can
work effectively at the whole IT system level and that security benefits can be quantified
in realistic IT deployments. In general, the challenges of effective movement, as stated by
Hobson et al.12, can be summarized in three main concerns: are the right components being
moved, is the movement performed in a large enough space, and is the movement taking
place at the right time?
Moreover, there are a number of more specific challenges to consider. For example, there
are many configuration parameters one can change in an IT system with complex dependen-
cies. Introducing random changes will almost certainly render the system unusable. Setting
up an IT system and making it function properly is already a time-consuming and compli-
cated job. Introducing changes proactively, if done improperly, may introduce additional
complexities. Making a complex system more complex is unlikely to increase its security.
Thus a practical MTD design must also simplify system configuration and maintenance,
while introducing the capability of moving. Changing a system while it is running inevitably
introduces overhead, which must be carefully examined to determine if the benefits exceed
costs. To address all these questions, it is important to be able to measure the effectiveness
of an MTD mechanism at the whole IT system level, which is still lacking today.
2
1.1 Thesis Statement
Moving Target Defenses for a whole IT system are feasible and can offer several benefits when
using a high-level abstraction that captures the objectives and dependencies at the whole IT
system level.
In order to be effective, the abstraction and the framework/platform that is leveraging it
should exhibit the following properties:
• Users and system engineers (i.e., a more specialized workforce) should be able to quan-
tify the cost of changing a running system in terms of the security and maintenance
benefits it presents.
• The abstraction must represent what a user needs instead of low-level details on how
to implement those needs.
• The abstraction must support automatic compilation into valid running (concrete) sys-
tems on various infrastructures (e.g., cloud infrastructures). Such compilation should
use well-defined knowledge units built by system engineers and be able to translate an
abstract specification into different concrete systems based on low-level implementa-
tion/platform choices.
• The abstraction should facilitate long-term maintenance of the system, including re-
placing and reconfiguring live instances. It should also securely and reliably orchestrate
those changes and aid in fault analysis and diagnosis.
3
1.2 Research Approach
This work addresses two main research questions:
1. Can MTD systems work effectively at the whole IT system level?
2. Can security benefits of MTD systems be quantified in realistic IT deployments?
In order to address the first question, we focused on designing and implementing a platform
that supports an MTD system: enables the system to move, to change. Changes should
not be noticed by benign users, they should affect only attackers while the overhead is
negligible. This work proposes an abstraction that captures what a user needs instead of
low-level details on how to implement those needs. The abstraction is accompanied by a
process that automatically compiles the abstraction into a valid running (concrete) system.
The proposed solution is packaged in a framework called ANCOR (Automated eNterprise
network COmpileR), as described in Chapter 2.
The purpose of introducing MTD at the whole IT system level is to leverage the ANCOR
framework to replace any component of an IT system with a fresh new one. In this work a
component is simply a virtual machine instance or a cluster of instances.
Although ANCOR can be configured to work directly with bare-metal machines, the
MTD approach is assumed to be deployed in a cloud environment. Advancements in vir-
tualization technology have contributed significantly to the evolution of cloud computing, a
movement that has the potential to revolutionize industry, and reshape the way IT systems
are designed, deployed, and utilized.13 Cloud infrastructures (e.g., OpenStack,14 Amazon
Web Services – AWS)15 made it possible and easy to create bare-metal equivalent instances
and networks resulting in the following common capabilities: provisioning instances (VMs)
with various hardware capabilities, utilizing security groups, designing the desired network-
ing layout, creating storage volumes, etc. It appears inevitable that IT systems of all sizes
are moving towards the cloud, whether private, public, or hybrid.
As previously mentioned, while there are various MTD mechanisms at different levels of a
system, this work refers to an MTD system as an IT system deployed and managed using an
4
ANCOR-based MTD platform, or ANCOR-MTD, that supports live instance replacements.
To address the second research question, this work analyzes the main aspects that reflect
the practicality and effectiveness of the ANCOR-MTD platform:
• Performance and functionality
• Security
The first objective was to evaluate how an MTD movement process (primarily instance re-
placement) affects running cloud IT systems in terms of functionality and performance. This
research evaluated a series of IT systems (e.g., eCommerce deployments, blogging website,
Mediawiki with Wikipedia database dumps, Hadoop scenario) and determined that perfor-
mance impacts are mostly negligible, statistically non-significant. Research efforts focused
on applications and not on the synchronization of large amounts of persistent data.
The study also focused on determining if the movement process brings any security
benefits and how these benefits can be quantified by measuring the effectiveness of an MTD
system in terms of meaningful interruptions it creates for an attacker and costs associated
with those interruptions. For this purpose, we introduced the notion of an attack window,
or a continuous time interval an attacker may leverage without being interrupted by MTD’s
system changes. Controlling attack window sizes and their distribution can help valuably
quantify potential security benefits MTD adds to the system, while indirectly increasing
attackers’ efforts and reducing their window of opportunity.
5
1.3 Contributions
This work supplies the following contributions to cybersecurity:
1. An MTD platform is presented for whole IT systems based on instance replacements
via a high-level abstraction-based approach to managing IT systems. The abstraction
captures dependencies among the system entities and can be used to calculate the
correct values of each instance’s (VM) configuration parameters at any time – at system
creation or while the system is running.
2. The practicality of this MTD approach is analyzed through a series of experiments on
realistic IT system scenarios. Experimental results show that MTD operations may
have negligible impact (statistically non-significant) on normal operations of the IT
systems.
3. Security benefits brought by this MTD approach are analyzed through an attack win-
dow model, showing how to leverage the model in order to quantify the security benefits
of an MTD configuration.
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1.4 Related Work
Although several research efforts in different areas16;17 have been established, MTD is still
in its infancy. Most previous work has focused on specific aspects of a system’s configura-
tion, such as IP addresses,4–6 memory layouts,18;19 instruction sets,9;10 html keywords,20;21
SQL queries,22 database table keywords,20 and so on. Additionally a few comprehensive
frameworks23;24 have been proposed, but most are still conceptual and require significant
theoretical and practical effort to bring them to fruition.
Previous works introduced software diversity in order to increase the difficulty of ex-
ploiting software vulnerabilities.7;8 Software diversity is an essential type of moving target
defense technique and, whereas applied to a different layer, it has many relations to the
approach presented in this work. The proposed MTD platform can be considered a compiler
for configuration primitives. The process of generating those primitives can be diversified
or randomized in the compilation process to further increase the “moving” dynamics of the
system. This is similar to software diversity through dynamic compilation. Our work can be
viewed as the first step towards this vision, and our instance reconfiguration and replacement
mechanism can be extended to accommodate more radical changes of the system, instead of
simply regenerating a fresh image with a pre-set configuration set up and a limited number
of randomized parameters.
SCIT25 is a technology for cleansing a machine image to achieve intrusion tolerance, and
it has previously been applied in a cloud environment.26 Our MTD platform’s instance re-
placement process achieves the same intrusion tolerance afforded by SCIT’s self-cleansing.
However, the proposed ANCOR-MTD platform does this through a higher-level abstraction
of the services’ dependencies to ensure that instance replacement will not disrupt the cloud
services’ operation. Moreover we show through a series of experiments that the MTD plat-
form instance replacement introduces a very small runtime overhead and it has the potential
to provide important security benefits.
Narain pioneered the use high-level specifications for network infrastructure configura-
tion management in the ConfigAssure27;28 and DADC29 projects. DADC attempts to bridge
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the gap between requirement and configuration by taking formally specified network config-
uration constraints and automatically finding acceptable concrete configuration parameter
values using a Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solver. The approach has recently been used to
achieve moving target defense at the network configuration layer.30 Similar ideas have also
been proposed by Al-Shaer in the MUTE31 framework that uses binary decision diagrams
(BDDs) to achieve moving target defense on network configurations. Our proposed MTD
platform adopts the same philosophy of using formal models to facilitate system manage-
ment, and focuses on the configuration of applications in a cloud, which differs from that of
network infrastructure.
In terms of metrics, Okhravi et al.32 performed a quantitative study of dynamic platforms
as a defensive mechanism. Specifically, the paper analyzed and evaluated how diversity, lim-
ited duration, multi-instance, and the cleanup effect of an MTD mechanism would impact the
attacker’s control time over an active platform, given the system vulnerability is successfully
exploited. Zhuang et al.33 also proposed an analytical model for analyzing the effectiveness
of moving target defenses in terms of the success likelihood of an intrusion. The model
is scalable and provides insight to designers into how the MTD mechanism would impact
pivoting-type attacks. Rodes et al.34 motivate the need for security arguments to facilitate
comprehensive security metrics by introducing a framework in which security is measured
by the degree of belief in a security claim.
Cybenko and Hughes35 introduced a quantitative framework to model diversity, and they
showed how it can defend the three core goals of cyber security: confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. The framework quantifies the security impact in terms of a joint probability
function that is described by a sequence of time-to-compromise random variables. The attack
window approach described in this dissertation quantifies cost while system components are
“moving”, thereby providing a new perspective on measuring security benefits of an MTD
mechanism. Hence it may constitute an important component for the proposed higher-level
metrics frameworks.
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Chapter 2
Compiling Abstract Specifications
into Running Systems
Cloud computing is revolutionizing industry and reshaping the way IT systems are designed,
deployed and utilized.13 However, every revolution has its own challenges. Already, com-
panies that have moved resources into the cloud are using terms like “virtual sprawl” to
describe the mess they have created.36 Cloud services are currently offered in several mod-
els: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a
Service (SaaS). While these options allow customers to decide how much management they
want to perform for their cloud-based systems, they do not provide good abstractions for
effectively managing those systems or addressing diverse user needs.
IaaS solutions such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) and OpenStack allow cloud users to
access the raw resources (compute, storage, bandwidth, etc.); however, it forces users to man-
age the software stack on their cloud instances at a low level. While this approach gives users
tremendous flexibility, it also allows the users to create badly configured or misconfigured
systems, raising significant concerns (especially related to security).37;38 Moreover, offering
automatic scalability and failover is challenging for cloud providers because replication and
state management procedures are application-dependent.13 On the other hand, SaaS (also
known as “on-demand software”) provides pre-configured applications to cloud users (e.g.,
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SalesForce and Google Apps). Users typically choose from a set of predefined templates,
which makes it difficult to adequately address the range of user needs. PaaS (e.g., Google
App Engine, Heroku, and Windows Azure) is somewhere in the middle, offering computing
platforms with various pre-installed operating systems as well as services and allowing users
to deploy their own applications as well. As PaaS is a compromise between IaaS and SaaS,
it also inherits the limitations of both to various degrees. For example, users can be easily
“locked in” to a PaaS vendor, like in SaaS, and the configuration of applications is still on
the users’ shoulders, like in IaaS.
We observe that existing cloud service models suffer from the lack of an appropriate
higher-level abstraction capable of capturing objectives and functionality of the whole IT
system. Such an abstraction, if designed well, can help both the creation and the long-term
maintenance of the system. While there have been attempts at providing abstractions at
various levels of cloud-based services, none have provided an abstraction that both separates
user requirements from low-level platform/system details and provides a global view of the
system. This has limited the usefulness of those solutions when it comes to long-term
maintenance, multi-platform support, and migration from one cloud provider to another.
We believe to be effective, the abstraction should exhibit the following properties.
1. It must be capable of representing what a user needs instead of low-level details on
how to implement those needs. A major motivation for using cloud infrastructures is
to outsource IT management to a more specialized workforce (called system engineers
hereafter). Communicating needs from users to engineers is better served using higher-
level abstractions as opposed to low-level system details.
2. It must support automatic compilation into valid concrete systems on different cloud
infrastructures. Such compilation should use well-defined knowledge units built by the
system engineers and be capable of translating a specification based on the abstrac-
tion (i.e., an abstract specification) into different concrete systems based on low-level
implementation/platform choices.
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3. It should facilitate the long-term maintenance of the system, including scaling the
system up/down, automatic fail over, application update, and other general changes
to the system. It should also support orchestrating those changes in a secure and
reliable manner and aid in fault analysis and diagnosis.
We believe such an abstraction will benefit all three existing cloud service models. For
IaaS, an abstract specification will act as a common language for cloud users and system
engineers to define the system, while the compilation/maintenance process becomes a tool
that enables system engineers to be more efficient in their jobs. Re-using the compilation
knowledge units will also spread the labor costs of creating those units across a large number
of customers. In the SaaS model the system engineers will belong to the cloud provider so
the abstract specification and the compilation/maintenance process will help them provide
better service at a lower cost. In the PaaS model we foresee using the abstraction and
compilation process to stand up a PaaS more quickly than can be done today. This could
even foster the convergence to a common set of PaaS APIs across PaaS vendors to support
easier maintenance and migration between PaaS clouds.
Nonetheless, such a vision is not only aligned with the objective of building an MTD
platform but also very needed. It’s flexibility and applicability to multiple environments
serve as a vital step towards making a whole IT system MTD approach a potential general
security solution.
There are multiple challenges in achieving this vision. The most critical is whether it is
feasible to design the abstraction so that it can capture appropriate system attributes in a
way that is meaningful to users and system engineers while being amenable to an automated
compilation process that generates valid concrete systems.
To demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed vision, we implemented and evaluated a
fully-functional prototype of our system, called ANCOR (Automated eNterprise network
COmpileR). The current implementation of ANCOR targets OpenStack14 and uses Pup-
pet39 as the configuration management tool (CMT); however, the framework can also be
targeted at other cloud platforms, such as AWS, or even tailored to work with virtualized
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infrastructures, such as VMware40 or bare-metal machines (by taking advantage of MaaS41
or a similar approach). Other CMT solutions (e.g., Ansible,42 Chef)43 may also be leveraged.
This part of the research was published in “Compiling Abstract Specifications into Con-
crete Systems: Bringing Order to the Cloud”44 in the USENIX Conference on Large Instal-
lation System Administration (LISA), Seattle (WA), November 2014.
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2.1 Limitations of Available Automation and Abstrac-
tion Technologies
Recent years have seen a proliferation of cloud management automation technologies. Some
of these solutions (e.g., , AWS OpsWorks) tend to focus on automation as opposed to ab-
straction. They include scripts that automatically create virtual machines, install software
applications, and manage the machine/software lifecycle. Some are even able to dynamically
scale the computing capacity36;45;46. Unfortunately, none of these solutions provide a way
to explicitly document the dependencies between the deployed applications. Instead, depen-
dencies are inferred using solution-specific methods for provider-specific platforms. Not only
is this unreliable (e.g., applications may have non-standard dependencies in some deploy-
ments), but it lacks the capability to maintain the dependency after the system is generated.
Ubuntu Juju47 is a special case that is described and discussed in Section 2.8 (Background:
Related Projects).
Recent years have also seen a general movement towards more abstractions at various
levels of cloud services, especially in PaaS. Examples include Windows Azure Service Defini-
tion Schema (.csdef)48 and Google AppEngine (GAE) YAML-based specification language.49
These abstractions are focused on a particular PaaS, thus they have no need to separate the
platform from user requirements. Rather, they simply abstract away some details to make
it easier for users to use the particular platform to deploy their apps. The abstractions only
capture applications under the users’ control and do not include platform service structures.
As a result the abstractions cannot support compiling abstract specifications to different
cloud platforms. It appears that these abstractions will likely make it harder for users to
move to other cloud providers as they are platform-specific.
Systems like Maestro,50 Maestro-NG,51 Deis52 and Flynn53 are based on Linux container
managers (in this case Docker).54 Some of the description languages in these systems (specif-
ically Maestro and MaestroNG) can capture dependencies among the containers (applica-
tions) through named channels. However, these specifications abstract instances (virtual
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machines), as opposed to the whole system. There is no formal model to define a globally
consistent view of the system, and as a result once a system is deployed it is challenging
to perform reliable configuration updates. Current Docker-based solutions are primarily fo-
cused on the initial configuration/deployment; maintenance is usually not addressed or they
resort to a re-deployment process.
The lack of a consistent high-level abstraction describing the whole IT system creates a
number of challenges in configuring cloud-based systems: network deployments and changes
cannot be automatically validated, automated solutions are error-prone, incremental changes
are challenging (if not impossible) to automate, and configuration definitions are unique to
specific cloud providers and are not easily ported to other providers.
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2.2 Enabling Technologies
Several new technologies have facilitated the development of our current prototype. In par-
ticular, there have been several advancements in the configuration management tools (CMT)
that help streamline the configuration management process. This is especially beneficial to
our work, since those technologies are the perfect building blocks for our compilation process.
To help the reader better understand our approach, we present a basic background on the
state-of-the-art CMTs.
Two popular configuration management solutions are Chef and Puppet. We use Puppet
but similar concepts exist in Chef and other CMTs as well. Puppet works by installing an
agent on the host to be managed, which communicates with a controller (called the master)
to receive configuration directives. Directives are written in a declarative language called
Puppet manifests, which define the desired configuration state of the host (e.g., installed
packages, configuration files, running services, etc.). If the host’s current state is different
than the manifest received by the Puppet agent, the agent will issue appropriate commands
to bring the system into the specified state.
In Puppet, manifests can be reused by extracting the directives and placing them in
classes. Puppet classes use parameters to separate the configuration data (e.g., IP ad-
dresses, port numbers, version numbers, etc.) from the configuration logic. Classes can be
packaged together in a Puppet module for reuse. Typically, classes are bound to nodes in
a master manifest known as the site manifest. Puppet can also be configured to use an
external program such as External Node Classifier (ENC)55 or Hiera56 to provide specific
configuration data to the classes that will be assigned to a node.
In the current prototype we use Hiera, which is a key/value look-up tool for configuration
data. Hiera stores site-specific data and acts as a site-wide configuration file, thus separating
the specific configuration information from the Puppet modules. Puppet classes can be
populated with configuration data directly from Hiera, which makes it easier to re-use public
Puppet modules “as is” by simply customizing the data in Hiera. Moreover, users can
publish their own modules without worrying about exposing sensitive environment-specific
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data or clashing variable names. Hiera also supports module customization by enabling the
configuration of default data with multiple levels of overrides.
Figure 2.1a is an example of a Puppet class for a worker queue based on Redis.57
Puppet classes can be reused in different scenarios without hard-coding parameters: in this
particular example there is only one parameter, port. The concrete value of this parameter
($exports["redis"]["port"]) is derived from Hiera (Figure 2.1b), which is shown as 6379
but can be computed automatically by a program at runtime. This allows us to calculate
parameters based on the up-to-date system model, as opposed to hardcoding them. We use
this technology in the compilation process described later.
class role::work_queue::default {
  $exports = hiera("exports")
  class { "profile::redis":
    port => $exports["redis"]["port"]
  }
}
(a) Puppet Worker Queue Class
classes:
  - role::work_queue::default
exports:
  redis: { port: 6379 }
(b) Hiera Configuration Data
Figure 2.1: Puppet class and corresponding Hiera configuration data
We should also emphasize that while our current prototype uses Puppet, ANCOR can
work with many mature CMT solutions such as Chef, Ansible,42 SaltStack,58 Bcfg2,59 or
CFEngine.60 Two important properties are required for a CMT to be useable by ANCOR.
First, the directives an agent receives dictates a desired state as opposed to commands for
state changes, which allows configuration changes to be handled in the same way as the
initial configuration. Second, there is a mechanism for reusable configuration modules (e.g.,
Puppet classes) that become the building blocks, or the “instruction set,” into which ANCOR
can compile the abstract requirements model. Depending on the specific CMT features, an
orchestrator component might also be needed (especially in case the CMT employs only a
pull-configuration model). An orchestrator component can be used on the CMT master node
to trigger different actions on the CMT agents (achieve a push-configuration model).
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2.3 ANCOR Framework
The three major components of the ANCOR framework are pictured in Figure 2.2: the
Operations Model, the Compiler, and the Conductor. The arrows denote information flow.
   Conductor
   Operations Model
Compiler
Cloud Platform 
(OpenStack)
Configuring Provisioning
Requirements 
ModelSystem Model
OpenStack API 
Library (Fog)
CMT (Puppet)
Orchestrator 
(Mcollective)
Figure 2.2: ANCOR framework
The key idea behind our approach is to abstract the functionality and structure of IT
services into a model that is used to generate and manage concrete systems. This high-
level abstraction is captured in the requirements model. We also maintain the details of the
concrete system in the system model. The two constitute the Operations Model. When
ANCOR compiles a requirements model into a concrete, cloud-based system, the system
17
model is populated with the details of the cloud instances and their correspondence to the
requirements model. When the system changes, the system model is updated to ensure it
has a consistent and accurate view of the deployment.
The Compiler references the requirements model to make implementation decisions nec-
essary to satisfy the abstract requirements and to instruct the conductor to orchestrate the
provisioning and configuration of the instances. It can also instruct the conductor to perform
user-requested configuration changes while ensuring the concrete system always satisfies the
requirements model.
The Conductor consists of two sub-components, Provisioning and Configuring, which are
responsible for interacting with the cloud-provider API, the CMT and orchestration tools
(shown below the dashed line).
The ANCOR framework manages the relationships and dependencies between instances
as well as instance clustering. Such management involves creating and deleting instances,
adding/removing instances to/from clusters, and keeping dependent instances/clusters aware
of configuration updates. The ANCOR framework simplifies network management as system
dependencies are formalized and automatically maintained. Moreover, traditional failures
can also be addressed, thus increasing network resiliency.
18
2.4 The Abstraction
The goal of our abstraction is to maintain an accurate picture of the whole IT system at
all times, an up-to-date overview of the services and their dependencies on other services.
The overview can then be leveraged in conjunction with dedicated solutions targeted at
managing primarily infrastructure resources (e.g., OpenStack Heat, CloudFormation) and
CMTs to automatically configure and change an IT system.
As previously mentioned, the key idea behind our abstraction is to separate user re-
quirements from the implementation details, and allow the users (system administrators) to
specify what they want in terms of service structure and dependencies in an abstract way
(see Figure 2.3). This high-level abstract specification (called the “requirements model”)
is then automatically compiled into concrete cloud-based systems, leveraging the existing
configuration management tools.
The compilation process populates a “system model” that reflects the low-level system
details corresponding to the requirements model. For example, the system model will provide
the mapping from the individual instances to the high-level roles they play in the overall
IT system. The combined system model and requirements model is called the “operations
model” (Figure 2.3). The operations model captures and maintains the dependencies among
the deployed instances at all times, which facilitates on-going system maintenance such as
cluster expansion and contraction, or instance replacement in a reliable manner.
IT systems are described in the operations model in terms of Goals and Roles. A Goal
is a high-level business objective whose purpose is to organize the IT capabilities (Roles)
around business goals. A Role can be viewed as a single unit of configuration. Basically
it represents a group of similarly configured instances that provide the same functionality.
Roles are the means that support the accomplishment of the deployed system’s Goal(s). For
example, a user wants to deploy a scalable and highly available eCommerce website which
adopts a multiple-layer architecture with various clusters of services, similar to Figure 2.4.
In terms of the abstraction, the Goal of the IT system is “eCommerce” and it is supported
by several Role structures such as web load balancer, web application, database master,
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Figure 2.3: Operations model (proposed abstraction): maintains an accurate picture of the whole
IT system, an up-to-date overview of the services and their dependencies on other services
database slave, messaging queue and background worker. Roles can be implemented in
numerous ways, various applications and operating systems (OSs) can be chosen to fulfill a
role, e.g., , web load balancer – installing Varnish61 on an Ubuntu62 instance or Nginx63 on
Fedora64 can achieve the same objective.
In our abstraction, a RoleImplementation specifies a concrete way to implement the in-
tended functionality embodied by a role. An implementation points to the CMT building
blocks used to build a Role; a Role has one or more implementations. Moreover, an In-
stance is a virtual machine that fulfills a Role by implementing one of the concrete CMT
modules specified in RoleImplementations. An instance that fulfills a Role makes a number
of resources, Channels, available to other instances. These resources are usually consumed
(imported) by the instances belonging to a dependent Role. Most of the times, the resource
is a single port or a set of ports. A set of ports captures a number of ports that need to
be made available at all times for a certain service to work properly. For example, usually
an FTP server needs two open ports to work properly; it establishes the data channel on
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one port (e.g., port 20) and the command channel on a different one (e.g., port 21). An
Instance Interface stores the MAC address(es) that belong to an instance and a Network
stores the network(s) that an instance is connected to. Moreover, an instance has access to
the ports that a role consumes or exposes (channels) through ChannelSelection. The cloud
provider firewall configuration (known as “security groups” in OpenStack) is captured in
SecurityGroup. One SecurityGroup can have multiple configuration entries, SecurityRules.
ProviderEndpoint captures the cloud platform specific API. This component makes it easier
to integrate ANCOR with different cloud providers (e.g., AWS).
Internal 
Network
External
Networkweblb_role
db_master_role db_slave_role
work_queue_role
webapp_role
worker_role
Figure 2.4: eCommerce website
2.4.1 ARML language
We specify the requirements model in a domain-specific language called the ANCOR Re-
quirements Modeling Language (ARML). ARML’s concrete syntax is based on YAML,65
which is a language that supports specification of arbitrary key-value pairs. The abstract
syntax of ARML is detailed in Figure 2.6.
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 1  goals:
 2 ecommerce:
 3   name: eCommerce deployment
 4   roles:
 5     - weblb_role
 6     - webapp_role
 7     - worker_role
 8        - worker_queue_role
 9     - db_master_role
10        - db_slave_role
11
12
13
14  roles:
15    weblb_role:
16   name: Web application load balancer
17   number_of_instances: 2
18   is_public: true
19   implementation_requirements:
20     default: 
21       interface: weblb
22       os: Ubuntu
23          same_implementation: false
24   exports:
25     http:
26       type: single_port
27       protocol: tcp
28       number: 80
29   imports:
30     webapp_role: http
31
32    webapp_role:
33   name: Web application
34   number of instances: 3
35   implementation_requirements:
36     default:
37       interface: webapp_rdb_mht
38       os: Ubuntu
39       same_implementation: true
40   exports:
41     http: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
42   imports:
43     db_master_role: rw_query
44     db_slave_role: r_query
45     work_queue_role: queue
46
47    worker_role:
48   name: Worker application
49   number_of_instances: 2
50   implementation_requirements:
51     default: 
52       interface: background_worker
53       os: Ubuntu
54       same_implementation: true
55      imports:
56     db_master_role: rw_query
57     db_slave_role: r_query
58     work_queue_role: access
59
60    work_queue_role:
61   name: Work queue application
62   number_of_instances: 2
63   implementation_requirements:
64        default: 
65       interface: work_queue
66       os: Ubuntu
67       same_implementation: true
68      exports:
69     queue: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
70
71    db_master_role:
72      name: Database master
73   number_of_instances: 1
74   implementation_requirements:
75     default: 
76       interface: db_master_rdb
77          os: Ubuntu
78      exports:
79     rw_querying: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
80
81    db_slave_role:
82   name: Database slave
83   number_of_instances: 2
84   implementation_requirements: 
85     default: 
86       interface: db_slave_rdb
87       os: Ubuntu
88       same_implementation: true
89      exports:
90     r_querying: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
91   imports: 
92     db_master_role: rw_query
Figure 2.5: eCommerce website ARML specification
Figure 2.5 shows an example ARML specification for an eCommerce website. The example is
a scalable and highly available eCommerce website on a cloud infrastructure, which adopts a
multiple-layer architecture with the various clusters of services shown in Figure 2.4: web load
balancer (Varnish), web application (Ruby on Rails66 with Unicorn)67, database (MySQL)68,
worker application (Sidekiq)69, and messaging queue (Redis). Arrows indicate dependency
between the clusters. Each cluster consists of multiple instances that offer the same services.
Clustering supports scaling via cluster expansion (adding more instances to the cluster)
or contraction (removing instances from the cluster). The clustering strategies employed
by these applications fall into two main categories: homogeneous and master-slave. In a
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ReqModel ::= goals   GoalSpec+
   roles   RoleSpec+
GoalSpec ::= goalID   [name   string]
   roles   roleID+
RoleSpec ::= roleID   [name   string]
  [number_of_instances   integer]
  [exports   ChannelSpec+]
  [imports   ImportSpec+] 
   implementation_requirements   ImplementationSpec+
ChannelSpec ::= channelID      type    single_port  |  set_of_ports 
     protocol     tcp  |  udp 
   [number   integer | integer,   ,integer]
ImportSpec ::= roleID   channelID+
ImplementationSpec ::= implementationID   interface   interfaceID
  os    string 
  same_implementation    true  |  false 
goalID, roleID, channelID, implementationID, interfaceID are symbols. 
integer and string are defined in the usual way.
Figure 2.6: ARML’s abstract syntax
homogeneous cluster all cluster members have the same configuration. If one of the instances
stops working, another instance takes over. In master-slave, the master and slave instances
have different configurations and perform different functions (e.g., write versus read). If the
master fails, a slave can be promoted to be the master. In this example system, the web load
balancer, web application, and the worker application employ the homogeneous clustering
while the database employs master-slave (thus MySQL master and MySQL slaves form one
cluster). Redis is used as a messaging queue. The clustering approach, mainly replication,
supported by Redis is not suited for high-throughput queues.
A requirements model contains the specifications of system goals and roles. A goal is a
high-level business goal (e.g., blog website, eCommerce website, etc.) whose purpose is to
organize the IT capabilities (roles) around business objectives. In Figure 2.5 there is a single
system goal ecommerce that is supported by six roles.
A role defines a logical unit of configuration. Examples include a database role, a web
application role, a message broker role, and so on. In essence, a role represents a group of
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similarly configured instances that provide the same functionality. In our model we use a
single role to represent all the instances that achieve that functionality. For example, the
web application instances in Figure 2.4 are configured identically (except for IP addresses,
ports, and credentials) and multiple load balancers dispatch incoming web requests to the
instances in the web application cluster. We have a single role webapp role for all the web
application instances, and a weblb role for all the load balancer instances. The role-to-
instance mapping is maintained in the system model.
A role may depend on other roles. A role uses a channel to interact with other roles. A
channel is an interface exported (provided) by a role and possibly imported (consumed) by
other roles. Channels could include a single network port or a set of ports. For instance,
the webapp role exports an http channel, which is a TCP port (e.g., , 80). weblb role
imports the http channel from the webapp role. A role is a “black box” to other roles, and
only the exported channels are visible interfaces. Using these interfaces the requirements
model captures the dependencies between the roles.
The webapp role also imports three channels from various other roles: querying from
db master, querying from db slave, and redis from work queue. This means the
webapp role depends upon three other roles: db master, db slave, and work queue.
The number of instances field indicates the number of instances that should be deployed
to play the role. If number of instances is not specified it’s default value is 1. The re-
quirements model addresses instance clustering naturally by requiring multiple instances to
play a role. For homogeneous clusters this is easy to understand. For master-slave clusters,
at least two roles are involved in the cluster, the master and the slave. The dependency
information captured in the export/import relationship is sufficient to support calculating
configuration changes when, for example, the master is removed from the cluster and a new
node is promoted to be the master. So far we have not found any real-world clustering
strategies that require explicitly modeling the cluster structure beyond the dependency re-
lationship between the roles that form the cluster. If more general clustering strategies are
needed, the requirements model can be extended to support them.
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2.4.2 Role Implementation
Role names are system-specific and are chosen by the user or system engineers to convey a
notion of the role’s purpose in the system; there are no pre-defined role names in ARML.
However, to automatically compile and maintain concrete systems, system engineers must
provide the semantics of each role, which is specified in the role specification’s implementa-
tion requirements field. The implementation requirements field defines how each instance
must be configured to play the role. The implementation information is processed by the
a module within the compiler (e.g., constraint model, described in Section 2.5). Next the
conductor is informed to which of the actual implementations it should point to properly
configure and deploy the concrete instances. The information about the actual implemen-
tation is thus dependent on the CMT being used. This process is similar to traditional
programming language compilers where abstract code constructs are compiled down to ma-
chine code. The compiler must contain the semantics of each code construct in terms of
machine instructions for a specific architecture.
The analogy between our ANCOR compiler and a programming language compiler nat-
urally begs the question: “what is the architecture-equivalent of a cloud-based IT system?”
In other words, is there an interface to a “cloud runtime” into which we can compile an
abstract specification? It turns out that a well-defined interface between the requirements
model and the “cloud runtime” is well within reach if we leverage existing CMT technologies.
As explained in Section 2.2, there has been a general movement in CMT towards encapsu-
lating commonly-used configuration directives into reusable, parameterized modules. Thus,
one can use both community and custom modules to implement roles and populate those
reusable knowledge units with parameters derived from our high-level requirements model.
Potential role implementations must be specified in a role’s “implementation requirements”
field (see Figure 2.5). A role may have multiple implementations since there could be more
than one way to achieve its functionality. The compiler then selects an appropriate role im-
plementation from those that satisfy all constraints levied by existing role implementations
in the system. More details on the selection process are presented in Section 2.5.
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An important challenge was structuring the knowledge units so that they could be easily
reused in different requirements models. Failing to have a proper role implementation design
model would lead to rewriting every single role implementation from scratch. We adopted
an approach similar to that used by Dunn.70 We name role implementations based on their
functionality and/or properties and use “profiles” to integrate individual components to
embody a logical software stack.
The software stack is constructed using community and custom modules as lower-level
components. In other words, profiles can be viewed as reusable custom-made classes that
aggregate these lower-level community and custom modules to implement a functional-
ity that might be needed in various role implementations across multiple scenarios. All
role implementations used with ANCOR are available on GitHub: https://github.com/
arguslab/ancor-puppet.
For instance, in case of the load balancer, let us assume that the weblb role points to
the role::weblb::default role implementation. Figure 2.7a is a Puppet class that shows
the implementation that was defined as default for the weblb role. Figure 2.7b pictures
a sample of possible parameters that Puppet is getting through Hiera from the compiler for
configuring one of the weblb role instances. There are two parts in each role implementa-
tion (see Figure 2.7a). The code before “---” imports operations model values from Hiera
(e.g., see Figure 2.7b). The statements hiera("exports") and hiera("imports") query
Hiera to find all the channels the web load balancer will consume (imports) and the channels
that it will make available to other roles (exports). These channels will be stored in two
variables, "exports" and "imports". The web load balancer will be instructed to expose
an http channel on a particular port (in this case port 80, see “exports” in Figure 2.7b),
and will be configured to use all instances that are assigned to play the webapp role, from
which it imports the http channel. Two different roles may use the same name for a re-
source they are exporting, even though there may be no relation between those resources
(e.g., weblb role and webapp role both use http to name their exports).
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class role::weblb::default {
  $exports = hiera("exports")
  $imports = hiera("imports")
---
  class { "profile::varnish":
    listen_port => $exports["http"]["port"] }
  
  $backends = $imports["webapp_role"]
  file { "default.vcl":
    ensure  => file,
    content => 
     template("role/weblb-varnish/default.vcl.erb"),
    path    => "/etc/varnish/default.vcl",
    owner   => root,
    group   => root,
    mode    => 644,
    require => Package["varnish"],
    notify  => Exec["reload-varnish"], }  
}
(a) Web load balancer role implementation
 {
  "exports": {
    "http": {
      "port": 80,
      "protocol": "tcp"
    }
  },
  "imports": {
    "webapp_role": {
      "webapp_role-ce66a264": {
        "ip_address": "10.118.117.16",
        "stage": "undefined",
        "planned_stage": "deploy",
        "http": {
          "port": 42683,
          "protocol": "tcp"
        }
      },
      "webapp_role-84407edd": {
        "ip_address": "10.118.117.19",
        "stage": "undefined",
        "planned_stage": "deploy",
        "http": {
          "port": 23311,
          "protocol": "tcp"
        }
      },
      "webapp_role-1ce1ce46": {
        "ip_address": "10.118.117.22",
        "stage": "undefined",
        "planned_stage": "deploy",
        "http": {
          "port": 10894,
          "protocol": "tcp"
        }
      }
    }
  },
  "classes": [
    "role::weblb::default"
  ]
(b) Specific weblb role parameters sample ex-
posed to Hiera by ANCOR
Figure 2.7: Web load balancer requirements and Hiera example of parameters
The default weblb role implementation is based on the reusable Puppet “Varnish profile”
(profile::varnish - see Figure 2.8). The profile::varnish Puppet class uses the neces-
sary specified parameters to customize the Varnish installation. Parameters (e.g., $listen -
address, $listen port, etc.) are initialized with default values. These values will be
overwritten in case they are specified in role::weblb::default. In the current example,
$listen port is the only parameter that will be overwritten (see Figure 2.7a), the other
parameters will keep their default values defined in profile::varnish. The parameters’
values (initialized in role::weblb::default or in profile::varnish) are passed to Fig-
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ure 2.9a and Figure 2.9b to generate the customized Varnish configuration files, and this is
all done by Puppet automatically at runtime.
class profile::varnish(
  $listen_address = "0.0.0.0",
  
# $listen_port's default value "6081" will be
# overwritten with the value passed
# from role::weblb::default
  $listen_port = 6081,
     
  $admin_listen_address = "127.0.0.1",
  $admin_listen_port = 6082) {
  apt::source { "varnish":
    location => 
      "http://repo.varnish-cache.org/ubuntu/",
    release => "precise",
    repos => "varnish-3.0",
    key => "C4DEFFEB",
    key_source => 
    "http://repo.varnish-cache.org/debian/GPG-key.txt", 
  }  
  package { "varnish":
    ensure => installed,
    require => Apt::Source["varnish"], }
    
  service { "varnish":
    ensure => running,
    require => Package["varnish"], }
    
  Exec {
   path => ["/bin", "/sbin", "/usr/bin", "/usr/sbin"] 
  }
   
  exec { "reload-varnish":
    command => "service varnish reload",
    refreshonly => true,
    require => Package["varnish"] }
    
  file { "/etc/default/varnish":
    ensure => file,
    content => 
      template("profile/varnish/default.erb"),
    owner => root,
    group => root,
    mode => 644,
    notify  => Service["varnish"],
    require => Package["varnish"], }
}
Figure 2.8: Varnish profile for a web load balancer
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# Configuration file for varnish
START=yes
NFILES=131072
MEMLOCK=82000
VARNISH_VCL_CONF=/etc/varnish/default.vcl
VARNISH_LISTEN_ADDRESS=<%= @listen_address %>
VARNISH_LISTEN_PORT=<%= @listen_port %>
VARNISH_ADMIN_LISTEN_ADDR=<%= @admin_listen_address %>
VARNISH_ADMIN_LISTEN_PORT=<%= @admin_listen_port %>
VARNISH_MIN_THREADS=1
VARNISH_MAX_THREADS=1000
. . .
(a) Web load balancer, Varnish, initialization
script: default.erb (used in profile::varnish)
<% @backends.each do |name, backend| %>
backend be_<%= name.sub("-", "_") %> {
  .host = "<%= backend["ip_address"] %>";
  .port = "<%= backend["http"]["port"] %>";
  .probe = {
    .url = "/";
    .interval = 5s;
    .timeout = 1s;
    .window = 5;
    .threshold = 3;
  }
}
<% end %>
director webapp round-robin {
  <% @backends.each_key do |name| %>
  {
    .backend = be_<%= name.sub("-", "_") %>;
  }
  <% end %>
}
sub vcl_recv {
  set req.backend = webapp;
}
(b) Web load balancer, Varnish, configuration
file: default.vcl.erb (used in role::weblb::default)
Figure 2.9: Web load balancer, Varnish, configuration files
Thus, a role implementation definition specifies a concrete way to implement the intended
functionality embodied by a role by describing the invocation of pre-defined configuration
modules with concrete parameters computed from the operations model. The use of a high-
level requirements model that explicitly captures the dependencies among the various roles
is crucial to automating this process. These role implementations are not only useful when
generating the system, but also for modifying the system as it changes over time. For
example, if a new instance is deployed to play the webapp role, the dependency structure
in the operations model allows ANCOR to automatically find all the other roles that may
be impacted (those depending on the webapp role) and use their role implementation to
direct the configuration management tool to reconfigure them so that they are consistent
with the updated operations model.
ANCOR leverages existing CMTs to define the role implementations, to minimize addi-
tional work that has to be done by the users. For example, only information in Figure 2.7a
is what one needs to write for ANCOR; Figure 2.7b is generated automatically by ANCOR;
Figure 2.8, 2.9a, and 2.9b are what one would have to specify anyway using Puppet.
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2.5 Constraint Model
The constraint model attempts to find a compatible combination of role implementations
(short-handed implementations) that will fulfill the roles defined in the ARML specification.
In other words, it will match a role with the implementations that are compatible with
the implementation requirements of the role, including its dependent and depended upon
(dependee) roles.
The constraint model ensures that role specifications and corresponding implementations
adhere to a common structure (e.g., the same number of imports and exports) and that the
required operating system is supported by the specific implementation. In addition to the
specification that defines the roles (ARML specification), the constraint model requires a
list with the available implementations and a way to match the two specifications – using
interfaces and schemas.
2.5.1 Inputs
The constraint model takes an ARML specification, a list of schemas and interfaces specs, and
a list of the available implementations specs as its input, and attempts to find a compatible
combination of implementations that fulfills the requirements. The list of schemas and
interfaces stores the characteristics of the roles and implementations; thus the constraint
model uses the list of schemas and interfaces to verify and match the implementations with
the role requirements specified in ARML format. The list of available implementations
describes the actual characteristics and needs of the software applications that are installed
using the CMT. Every implementation from this list implements an interface specified in the
schema and interface list.
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Figure 2.10: Two eCommerce deployments
Let us consider a number of different eCommerce deployments as pictured in Figure 2.10,
a list of schemas and interfaces (see Figure 2.11), and the descriptions for the available
implementations (Figure 2.14).
The abstract syntaxes that describe the structures of the schemas-interfaces and imple-
mentations lists are illustrated in Figures 2.12 and 2.15. Similar to ARML, the concrete
syntax is based on YAML in the schemas-interfaces and implementations lists. While an
ARML specification describes a whole IT system (one scenario), the list of schemas and in-
terfaces, and the list of available implementations may be used for multiple whole IT systems
(e.g., Figure 2.10).
Thus, the name tag of an implementation (Figure 2.14) may also be used to point to the
location of the CMT modules implementing it (e.g., role::ecommerce:weblb::nginx points
to the location of the nginx Puppet manifest in the current ANCOR prototype). The cor-
responding ARML specs for Figure 2.10a are pictured in Figure 2.5, while the requirements
for Figure 2.10b are specified in Figure 2.13.
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 1  # available_schemas_and_interfaces
 2  
 3  er exp:
 4    type: single_port
 5    protocol: tcp
 6    
 7  ir imp
 8
 9  schema no_imp_one_exp: 
10    exports: exp
11
12  schema no_imp_two_exp:
13 exports: {exp, exp}
14
15  schema one_imp_one_exp:
16 exports: exp
17 imports: imp
18
19  schema two_imp_one_exp:
20 exports: exp
21 imports: {imp, imp}
22
23  schema three_imp_one_exp:
24 exports: exp
25 imports: {imp, imp, imp}
26
27  schema three_imp_no_exp:
28    imports: {imp, imp, imp}     
29
30  interface db_master_rdb:
31    conforms: no_imp_one_exp
32    exports:
33   rw_query: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
34      
35  interface work_queue:   
36 conforms: no_imp_one_exp
37 exports: 
38   queue: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
39     
40  interface db_slave_rdb:
41 conforms: one_imp_one_exp
42 exports:
43   r_query: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
44 imports:
45   db_master_rdb: rw_query
46    
47  interface webapp:
48 conforms: no_imp_one_exp
49 exports: 
50   http: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
51
52  interface webapp_rdb:
53 conforms:one_imp_one_exp
54 extends: webapp
55 imports: 
56   db_master_rdb: rw_query
57     
58  interface webapp_rdb_ht:
59 conforms: two_imp_one_exp
60 extends: webapp
61 imports:
62   db_master_rdb: rw_query
63   db_slave_rdb: r_query
64    
65  interface webapp_rdb_mht: 
66 conforms: three_imp_one_exp
67 extends: webapp
68 imports:
69   db_master_rdb: rw_query
70   db_slave_rdb: r_query
71   work_queue: queue 
72     
73  interface weblb:
74 conforms: one_imp_one_exp
75 exports: 
76   http: {type: single_port, portocol: tcp, port: 80}
77 imports:
78   webapp: http
79
80  interface background_worker:
81 conforms: three_imp_no_exp
82 imports:
83   db_master_rdb: rw_query
84   db_slave_rdb: r_query
85   work_queue: queue
Figure 2.11: List of available interfaces and schemas. This list may include the schemas and
interfaces descriptions used in multiple ARML specs
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InterfaceSchemaList ::= (schema schemaID   SchemaSpec)+
    (interface interfaceID   InterfaceSpec)+
     
SchemaSpec ::= [exports   Er+]
     [imports   Ir+]
Er ::= er erID      type    single_port  |  set_of_ports 
    protocol     tcp  |  udp 
       [port   integer | (integer,   ,integer)]
Ir ::= ir irID   (interfaceID   channelID)*
InterfaceSpec ::= conforms   schemaID
  [extends   interfaceID]
  [exports   ChannelSpec+]
  [imports   ImportSpec+]
ChannelSpec ::= channelID   type    single_port  |  set_of_ports 
    protocol    tcp  |  udp 
   [number   integer | (integer,   ,integer)]
ImportSpec ::= interfaceID   channelID+
roleID, channelID, interfaceID, schemaID, erID, irID are symbols. 
integer and string are defined in the usual way.
Figure 2.12: Abstract syntax for the list of interfaces and schemas
 1   goals:
 2  ecommerce:
 3    name: eCommerce deployment
 4       roles:
 5        - weblb_role
 6        - webapp_role
 7        - db_master_role
 8
 9   roles:
10  weblb_role:
11    name: Web application load balancer
12       number_of_instances: 2
13    is_public: true
14    implementation_requirements:
15      default: 
16           interface: weblb
17           os: Ubuntu
18           same_implementation: false
19    exports:
20      http:
21        type: single_port
22           protocol: tcp
23        number: 80
24    imports:
25      webapp_role: http
26
27   webapp_role:
28     name: Web application
29  number of instances: 3
30  implementation_requirements:
31    default:
32      interface: webapp_rdb
33      os: Ubuntu
34      same_implementation: true
35  exports:
36       http: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
37    imports:
38      db_master_role: rw_query
39
40   db_master_role:
41  name: Database master
42  number_of_instances: 1
43  implementation_requirements:
44    default: 
45      interface: db_master_rdb
46      os: Ubuntu
47  exports:
48    rw_querying: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
Figure 2.13: Lightweight eCommerce deployment
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  1 # available_role_implementations
 2  
 3   varnish:
 4  name:  role::ecommerce::weblb::default 
 5     description: Varnish webapp load balancer
 6  interfaces: weblb
 7  compatible_os: [Ubuntu, Fedora]
 8  imported_role_impls: 
 9    webapp: [rails_super_lite]
10     
11   nginx:
12  name:  role::ecommerce::weblb::nginx 
13  description: Nginx webapp load balancer
14  interfaces: weblb
15  compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
16  imported_role_impls: 
17    webapp: [rails, rails_crazy]
18  
19   rails_super_lite:
20  name:  role::ecommerce::webapp::railsSL 
21  description: Super lite Rails deployment
22  interfaces: webapp_rdb
23  compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
24  imported_role_impls:
25    db_master_rdb: [postgres_master]
26   
27   rails_crazy:
28  name:  role::ecommerce:webapp:railscrazy 
29  description: Tweaked Rails deployment
30  interfaces: webapp_rdb_ht
31  compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
32  imported_role_impls:
33    db_master_rdb: [mysql_master]
34    db_slave_rdb: [mysql_slave]
35
36   rails:
37  name:  role::ecommerce::webapp:default 
38  description: Rails with Unicorn and Nginx
39  interfaces: webapp_rdb_mht
40  compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
41  imported_role_impls:
42    db_master_rdb: [mysql_master, postgres_master]
43    db_slave_rdb: [mysql_slave, postgres_slave]
44    work_queue: [redis]
45
46  sidekiq:
47 name:  role::ecommerce::worker::default 
48 description: Sidekiq background worker
49 interfaces: background_worker
50 compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
51 imported_role_impls:
52   db_master_rdb: [mysql_master]
53   db_slave_rdb: [mysql_slave]
54   work_queue: [redis, rabbit]
55   
56   redis:
57  name:  role::ecommerce:work_queue::default 
58  description: Redis used as a work queue
59  interfaces: work_queue
60  compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
61     
62   rabbit:
63  name:  role::ecommerce::work_queue::rabbit 
64  description: RabbitMQ used as a work queue
65  interfaces: work_queue
66  compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
67
68   mysql_master:
69  name:  role::ecommerce::db_master::default 
70  description: MySQL database master
71  interfaces: db_master_rdb
72  compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
73
74   mysql_slave:
75  name:  role::ecommerce:db_slave::default 
76  description: MySQL slave
77  interfaces: db_slave_rdb
78  compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
79  imported_role_impls:
80    db_master_rdb: [mysql_master]
81
82   postgres_master:
83  name:  role::ecommerce::db_master::postgres 
84  description: Postgres database master
85  interfaces: db_master_rdb
86  compatible_os: [Ubuntu, Fedora]
87
88   postgres_slave: 
89     name:  role::ecommerce::db_master::postgres 
90     description: Postgres database slave
91     interfaces: db_slave_rdb
92     compatible_os: [Ubuntu, Fedora]
93     imported_role_impls:
94       db_master_rdb: [postgres_master]
Figure 2.14: List of available role implementations. This list may include the implementations
used in multiple ARML specs.
RoleImplList ::= RoleImplSpec
+
        
RoleImplSpec ::= roleImplID   name   string
                              [description   string]
     interface   interfaceID 
   compatible_os    string+
   imported_role_impls   {(interfaceID   roleImplID+)+}
roleImplID, interfaceID is a symbol. 
integer and string are defined in the usual way.
Figure 2.15: Abstract syntax for the list of role implementations
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Definition 1. A schema is a structure (outline) that is common to all adhering members.
Definition 2. We view an interface as a contract that specifies certain characteristics
that will apply to any implementing entity. The structural constraints for an interface are
specified in a schema, an interface always conforms to a schema. An interface may also
inherit characteristics from another interface. Inheritance implies a union operation between
the sets of characteristics in the child interface and the parent interface.
The webapp role from Figure 2.10a may have multiple implementations but although many
implementations are webapps (e.g., rails, rails super lite, rails crazy) that support the
required OS, only rails is compatible with the webapp role (implements the interface –
webapp rdb mht). The number of imported impls in rails differs from the number of
imported impls in rails crazy or rails super lite. Therefore their implementations
point to different interfaces (implement different contracts). However, the webapp role as
defined in the ARML spec in Figure 2.13 and in Figure 2.10b conforms to the webapp rdb
interface, and only rails super lite may be able to implement it.
An interface conforms to a schema and adheres to the structural restrictions specified
in the schema description (Figure 2.11). Usually restrictions refer to the number of exports
and imports – resources made available to other implementations and resources needed to
implement the desired functionality. For instance, weblb adheres to the one imp one exp
schema and, thus, it has one import and one export. In other words, all role specifications
(e.g., weblb role from Figure 2.10a) and implementations specs (e.g., nginx, varnish
from Figure 2.14) that adopt the interface weblb will have one import and one export.
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2.5.2 Roles-Interfaces Relationship
A role implements an interface if
1. the interface name is specified in the role specification;
2. the interface and the role have the same number of imports and exports;
3. role exports have the same structure (same type, protocol, and port number) as the
interface exports;
4. imported roles implement (or inherit) the interfaces stated in the interface imports;
5. role imports have the same structure (same type, protocol, and port number) with
the interface imports.
Figure 2.16 shows an example of a role implementing an interface.
weblb_role:
  name: Web application load balancer
  number_of_instances: 2
  is_public: true
  implementation_requirements:
    default: 
      interface: weblb
      os: Ubuntu
      same_implementation: false
  exports:
    http:
      type: single_port
      protocol: tcp
      number: 80
  imports:
    webapp_role: http
interface weblb:
  conforms: one_imp_one_exp
  exports: 
    http: {type: single_port, portocol: tcp, port: 80}
  imports:
    webapp: http
5. Same structure for http resource 
imported by weblb_role and 
exported by webapp_role  
4. webapp_role implements 
webapp_rdb_mht which inherits webapp
webapp_role:
  ...  
      interface: webapp_rdb_mht
  ...
  exports:
    http: {type: single_port, protocol: tcp}
interface webapp_rdb_mht:
  ...
  extends: webapp
  ...
interface webapp:
  conforms: no_imp_one_exp
  exports: 
    http: { type: single_port, protocol: tcp }
expand
1. Implements 
weblb interface
2. One export and 
one import
3. exports have the same 
structure (same type, 
protocol,port number)
Figure 2.16: Role complies with interface example
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2.5.3 Role Implementations-Interfaces Relationship
An implementation complies with an interface if
1. the interface name is specified in the implementation spec;
2. the number of interface imports is equal to the number of imported impls from the
implementation’s specification;
3. the imports’ names from the interface spec are the same with the imported impls
from the implementation’s specification;
4. implementations (values) specified in imported impls need to implement (or inherit)
their corresponding interface (key) name.
Figures 2.17 shows the implications of an implementation complying with an interface.
nginx:
  name:  role::ecommerce::weblb::nginx 
  description: Nginx webapp load balancer
  interfaces: weblb
  compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
  imported_impls: 
    webapp: [rails, rails_crazy]
interface weblb:
  conforms: one_imp_one_exp
  exports: 
    http: {type: single_port, portocol: tcp, port: 80}
  imports:
    webapp: http
1. Implements 
weblb interface
2. One import
3. Same interface name
(webapp) 
4. rails_crazy and rails implement 
webapp_rdb_ht and 
webapp_rdb_mht and both interfaces 
inherit webapp
rails_crazy:
  ...  
  interfaces: webapp_rdb_ht
  ...
interface webapp_rdb_ht:
  ...
  extends: webapp
  ...
expand
expand
rails:
  ...
  interfaces: webapp_rdb_mht
  ...
interface webapp_rdb_mht: 
  ...
  extends: webapp
  ...
Figure 2.17: Implementation complies with interface example
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2.5.4 Assigning Role Implementations to Roles
Definition 3. A candidate implementation for a role X implements the same interface
as X and supports the operating system required by X. Role X is specified in ARML format.
Definition 4. Implementation A depends on implementation B if B’s interface is present
in A’s imported impls.
Definition 5. Compatibility refers to implementations being able to work with each other
in the same scenario. Implementation A depends on implementation B. A and B are
compatible if A’s imported impls contains B. Implementations that do not depend on each
other are also considered compatible (do not directly influence each other’s functionality).
A candidate implementation for a role, implements the interface and supports the re-
quired OS as specified in the role’s ARML spec. In the current version of the constraint
model, a role implementation supports a required OS if the OS specified in the ARML role
is among the OSs specified in the implementation’s specification. Such an example is pic-
tured in Figure 2.18. A clean image of an operating system used in the list of available
implementations must be supported and present on the targeted cloud infrastructure. More
specific OS version names (e.g., Ubuntu14.04 x64) may also be used in the current format.
Once the constraint model was able to find at least one candidate implementation for
each role, it must check the compatibility of the implementations with the implementations
of the imported and dependent roles. For this purpose, the constraint model can trans-
late the individual compatibility constraints between candidate implementations to boolean
formulas and leverage the benefits of a satisfiability solver (SAT solver). Satisfiability con-
stitutes a solution to a boolean formula that is an assignment of values to the formula’s
boolean variables that result in the formula becoming true29;71. If the formula is satisfiable,
a SAT solver will produce an example of a truth assignment. The ultimate goal is to find a
compatible combination of implementations that will fulfill the roles defined in the ARML
specification.
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nginx:
  name:  role::ecommerce::weblb::nginx 
  description: Nginx webapp load balancer
  interfaces: weblb
  compatible_os: [Ubuntu]
  imported_impls: 
    webapp: [rails, rails_crazy]
weblb_role:
  name: Web application load balancer
  number_of_instances: 2
  is_public: true
  implementation_requirements:
    default: 
      interface: weblb
      os: Ubuntu
      same_implementation: false
  exports:
    http:
      type: single_port
      protocol: tcp
      number: 80
  imports:
    webapp_role: http
varnish:
  name:  role::ecommerce::weblb::default 
  description: Varnish webapp load balancer
  interfaces: weblb
  compatible_os: [Ubuntu, Fedora]
  imported_impls: 
    webapp: [rails, rails_crazy]
Ubuntu   [Ubuntu, Fedora] 
AND 
Ubuntu   [Ubuntu]
Figure 2.18: Required ARML role OS supported in a role implementation
The current version of the constraint model uses Alloy.72 Alloy is a language for describing
structures and a tool for exploring them.71;72 Hence the constraint model populates an Alloy
template model (see Figure 2.19) with information specific to the three inputs (ARML spec,
list of schemas and interfaces, and list of implementations) and passes it to the Alloy Ana-
lyzer. The Alloy Analyzer works by reduction to SAT and, thus, it employs a SAT solver to
find a solution.
Alloy Model
An Alloy model is built from atoms and relations. An atom is an indivisible, immutable and
uninterpreted primitive entity while a relation is a structure that relates atoms.71
Figure 2.19 pictures snippets from the Alloy model generated based on the inputs we
utilized for the eCommerce website scenario specified in Figure 2.5. Signatures (sig) de-
scribe the basic data elements we want to reason about and introduce the sets of atoms.
We have generated an abstract signature with the appropriate fields for a role (Role),
an interface (Interface) and a role implementation (RoleImpl). A field defines relations
between the signatures while an abstract signature has no elements except those belong-
ing to its extensions and subsets. Therefore, for each role, interface and implementation
from the inputed lists we have generated one signature that extends the corresponding ab-
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stract signature (e.g., one sig Weblb role extends Role {}; one sig Weblb extends
Interface {}; one sig Varnish extends RoleImpl {}). Extensions of the same signa-
ture are mutually disjoint. We have also defined a signature for the imported role imple-
mentations (ImportedRi) and use facts (fact) and predicates (pred) constructs to capture
the entire eCommerce environment. Facts denote additional constraints on signatures while
predicates are named constraints, with zero or more arguments. We packaged the additional
constraints on the top-level signatures as predicates and then included the predicates in facts
to capture the relationships between roles, interfaces and implementations.
Alloy specifications can also be viewed from an object-oriented perspective. Signatures
(e.g., Role, RoleImpl, Interface, Weblb role etc.) are analogous to classes while a field
(e.g., interface) of a certain type (e.g., Interface) holds references to objects of that
particular type. Moreover, relations (e.g., interface one -> some ri) play a role similar
to Ruby hashes73 or Python dictionaries74 – they map elements in the domain type (e.g.,
interface from Interface) to elements in the range type (e.g., ri from RoleImpl).
The objective of the Alloy model is to find a compatible combination of role implemen-
tations that will fulfill the roles defined in the ARML specification. The solution is stored
in the SoftwareStack signature and “computed” by running the findImpl predicate. For a
candidate implementation to be associated to a role the findImpl predicate checks for the
following conditions:
• Same interface: Role and the candidate implementation implement the same interface
(e.g., role1.interface = ri1.interface)
• Compatibility with the implementations of the dependent roles: Implementations of the
imported role(s) are among the supported implementations of the current implemen-
tation (e.g., s.imp[role1.imported roles] in ri1.imported role impls.ri)
Optional (“sanity”) checks may also be added, and they may verify whether the number
of imports is the same in the role and in the candidate implementation or if the interface
names of the imported roles match (or are inherited by) the interfaces in the imported role
implementations.
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module constraintModel/dependent_dependee_check
//Roles from the ARML specification
abstract sig Role {
interface: one Interface,
imported_roles: set Role
} 
one sig Weblb_role extends Role {} 
...
one sig Db_slave_role extends Role {}
//Interfaces from list of available schemas and interfaces
abstract sig Interface {}
one sig Weblb extends Interface {}
...
one sig Db_slave_rdb extends Interface {}
//Role Implementations from the list of available implementations
abstract sig RoleImpl {
interface: some Interface,
imported_role_impls: set ImportedRi
}
sig ImportedRi {
interface: one Interface,
ri: some RoleImpl,
imported_ris: interface one -> some ri
}
one sig Varnish extends RoleImpl {}
...
one sig Postgres_slave extends RoleImpl {}
fact {
//parameters' order: current_role, interface
populateRoleInterface [Weblb_role, Weblb]
...
populateRoleInterface [Db_slave_role, Db_slave_rdb]
//Populating role imports parameters' order: current_role, role1, role2, etc.
populateRoleImports [Weblb_role, none, Webapp_role, none, none, none, none]
...
populateRoleImports [Db_slave_role, none, none, none, none, Db_master_role, none]
...  }
...
//SoftwareStack stores the solution 
sig SoftwareStack {
  imp: Role -> RoleImpl
}
pred findImpl (s: SoftwareStack, role1: Weblb_role, role2: Webapp_role, role3: Worker_role, 
              role4: Work_queue_role, role5: Db_master_role, role6: Db_slave_role, 
   ri1: RoleImpl, ri2: RoleImpl, ri3: RoleImpl, ri4: RoleImpl, 
   ri5: RoleImpl, ri6: RoleImpl) {
role1.interface = ri1.interface  
      #role1.imported_roles = #ri1.imported_role_impls 
s.imp[role1.imported_roles] in ri1.imported_role_impls.ri
s.imp[role1] = ri1
...
}
run findImpl for 1 SoftwareStack, 9 ImportedRi 
Figure 2.19: Alloy model generated based on inputs from Figures 2.5, 2.11, 2.14. Red text are
values populated from the input lists, blue text is generated as needed (e.g., number of roles), black
text is part of the default template.
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Constraint Model Implementation
Algorithm 1 provides an overview of the constraint model’s actions.
Algorithm 1 Constraint model actions. “impls” stands for implementations.
1: procedure constraint model(ARML spec, schema interface list, impls list)
2: Initialization and parsing the lists: ARML spec, schema interface list, impls list
3: // “Type checking” and OS compatibility:
4: for each role in the ARML spec do
5: Find all candidate impls
6: end for
7: for each role’s candidate impls do
8: Drop candidate impls that don’t support the required OS
9: (role.os /∈ impl.compatible os)
10: end for
11: // Impls compatibility with the impls of dependent and dependee roles:
12: for each role in the ARML spec do
13: Populate Alloy template with data about the candidate impls and from the three
parsed lists (ARML spec, schema interface list, impls list)
14: end for
15: Pass final rendered template to Alloy and run Alloy Analyzer
16: Retrieve solution from Alloy (the solution is a combination of compatible impls that
will fulfill the role specs or ∅)
17: end procedure
The current prototype uses a Ruby module to parse the YAML75 inputs and the Ruby
Erubis template engine76 to generate the Alloy model in an automated fashion. Erubis is
a fast, secure, and extensible implementation of eRuby, which means “embedded Ruby”
in documents.77 Appendix C contains a sample ERB/Erubis template for generating the
Alloy model described in Figure 2.19. The constraint model may also be implemented as a
stand-alone module that interacts with ANCOR when compatibility checks are needed.
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2.6 ANCOR Workflow
There are four main phases involved in creating and managing cloud-based systems using
the ANCOR framework.
1. Requirements model specification
2. Compilation choices specification
3. Compilation/Deployment
4. Maintenance
The first two phases result in the creation of the requirements model while the next phase
performs the actual deployment of the cloud-based system. The final phase, maintenance, is
performed throughout the lifecycle of the system and may include other phases within it. In
a perfect world, the phases are performed sequentially; however, reality is rarely ever that
neat. In general, we expect that this is an iterative process that will require the repetition of
multiple phases during the lifecycle of a given system. Each of the four phases is discussed
in more detail below.
Requirements Model Specification
In this phase, the user and system engineers work together to define the goals of the system,
which may require significant input from various stakeholders. Next, they determine the
roles required to achieve each goal and the dependencies among the roles. The high-level re-
quirement language ARML provides an abstract, common language for this communication.
Compilation Choices Specification
In this phase, system engineers define role semantics using pre-defined CMT modules. In
our current prototype this is accomplished by defining the role implementations that invoke
Puppet classes as described in Section 2.4.2. If no appropriate CMT modules exist, system
engineers must define new profiles, update the list of available role implementations, and,
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if needed, the schemas and interfaces list. In general, system engineers should specify mul-
tiple implementation choices using various operating systems for each role to provide the
constraint model flexibility in choosing the appropriate combination of implementations.
Compilation/Deployment
Once the requirements model has been defined, the framework can automatically compile
the requirements into a working system on the cloud provider’s infrastructure. This process
has seven key steps:
1. The framework signals the compiler to deploy a specific requirements model.
2. The compiler makes several implementation decisions including the number of instances
used for each role, the operating systems, and the role implementations.
3. The compiler signals the conductor component to begin deployment.
4. The conductor interacts with the OpenStack API to provision instances and create
the necessary security rules (configure the cloud’s internal firewall). The provisioning
module uses a package such as cloud-init to initialize each cloud instance, including
installing the CMT and orchestration tool agents (e.g., the Puppet agent and MCol-
lective78 agent).
5. Once an instance is live, the message orchestrator (e.g., MCollective) prepares the
instance for configuration.
6. The configuration is pushed to the authenticated instances using the CMT agent and,
if needed, the orchestrator (e.g., Puppet agent and MCollective).
7. System engineers may check deployed services using system monitoring applications,
such as Sensu79 or Opsview,80 or by directly accessing the instances.
In the current implementation, the configuration from step 6 is carried out via the Hiera
component, while configuration directives (node manifests) are computed on the fly using
ANCOR’s operations model. This ensures that the parameters used to instantiate the Puppet
modules always reflect the up-to-date system dependency information.
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Maintenance
System engineers can modify the system once the system is deployed in the cloud. If the
change does not affect the high-level requirements model, the maintenance is straightforward.
The compiler will track the impacted instances using the operations model and re-configure
them using the up-to-date system information. A good example for this type of change is
cluster expansion/contraction.
Cluster expansion is used to increase the number of instances in a cluster (e.g., to serve
more requests or for high-availability purposes).
1. System engineers instruct the compiler to add instances to a specific role.
2. The compiler triggers the conductor component to create new instances, which auto-
matically updates the ANCOR system model.
3. The compiler calculates the instances that depend on the role and instructs the con-
figuration manager to re-configure the dependent instances based on the up-to-date
ANCOR system model.
Cluster contraction is the opposite of cluster expansion. The main goal of cluster con-
traction is to reduce the number of instances in a cluster (e.g., to lower cost).
1. System engineers instruct the compiler to mark a portion of a role’s instances for
removal.
2. The compiler calculates the instances that depend on the role and instructs the con-
figuration manager to re-configure the dependent instances based on the up-to-date
ANCOR system model.
3. The compiler triggers the conductor component to remove the marked instances.
If the change involves major modifications in the requirements model (e.g., adding/removing
a role), ANCOR will need to re-compile the requirements model. Performing “incremental
recompilation” involving major structural changes without undue disruption will be a topic
for future research.
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2.7 Prototype Implementation
We built a prototype (see Figure 2.20) in Ruby (using Rails, Sidekiq and Redis) to implement
the ANCOR framework (Figure 2.2) using OpenStack as the target cloud platform. The
operations model is stored in MongoDB collections using Rails.
ANCOR employs an initial straight-forward type-checking to ensure that the ARML
specification is well-formed (e.g., allowing a role to import a channel from another role only
if the channel is exported by that role). More type checking tasks are performed as part of
the constraint model as described in the previous sections, 2.5.2 and 2.5.3. The compiler
references the MongoDB document collections that store the operations model and interacts
with the conductor using a Redis messaging queue and Sidekiq, a worker application used
for background processing.
The conductor interacts with the OpenStack API through Fog81 (a cloud services library
for Ruby) to provision the network, subnets and instances indicated by the compiler. Once
an instance is live, the configuration module uses Puppet and MCollective to configure it
using the manifest computed on the fly based on the operations model. The conductor also
interacts with the system model and updates the provided system model database every
time it performs a task (provisioning or configuration). Therefore, the system model stored
in the MongoDB datastore will always have an updated picture of the system. Obviously,
the different role implementation choices (e.g., Sidekiq, Redis or Rails) used to build the
eCommerce website example scenario (Figure 2.4) are independent from the components that
leverage Sidekiq, Redis and Ruby on Rails in the ANCOR framework prototype (Figure 2.2).
The current implementation uses a workflow model that is based on chained and parallel
tasks processing. Once the ARML specification is entered by the user, the specification will
be parsed and the requirements model will be encountered. Next, the compiler steps in and
based on the requirements model it chooses the number of instances that play a role, the
role implementations, the IP addresses, the channels (port number and/or sockets that will
be consumed or exposed), etc. Then the compiler populates the system model and creates
various tasks that it passes to the worker queue. A task can be viewed as an assignment
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that is passed to a background (worker) process. In ANCOR, Sidekiq is used for background
processing.
Tasks are stored in the database and have several attributes (e.g., type, arguments, state,
context). A task can be related to provisioning (e.g., using Fog) or to configuring an instance
(e.g., push configuration from Puppet master to Puppet agent). In case other tasks (e.g.,
deploy instance) depend on the execution of the current task (e.g., create network) a wait
handle is created. Wait handles can be viewed as the mechanism used by the tasks to signal
dependent tasks when they finished execution. A task creates a wait handle object that
stores the ids of the tasks that wait for it to execute. Once the task finished, the wait handle
triggers all the dependent tasks to execute. The purpose of a wait handle is to start, resume
or suspend the dependent tasks. Using this approach we can resume or suspend a task
several times including tasks related to the orchestration tool (MCollective) and the CMT
(Puppet). Independent tasks (e.g., two deploy instance tasks) will be executed in parallel
employing locks on certain shared resources.
The ANCOR prototype code, detailed instructions on how to deploy and run it, and a
detailed document containing specific implementation details are available online. 1
1The current ANCOR implementation is available and is distributed under the GNU (version 3) General
Public License terms: https://github.com/arguslab/ancor
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Figure 2.20: ANCOR prototype implementaion
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Using ANCOR
The current framework implementation exposes a REST API82 to it’s clients (see Fig-
ure 2.20). The current clients include a Command-Line Interface (CLI), a web-browser dash-
board and also the Puppet master (specifically the Hiera module). Through the REST API,
Hiera is obtaining the specific configuration details (e.g., imported and exported channels
- $exports and $imports arrays, see Figure 2.1a) from the compiler in order to customize
the Puppet modules that are part of the chosen role implementation (e.g., see Figure 2.1b).
The CLI and the dashboard are used to deploy, manage, visualize (in case of the dashboard)
and delete ANCOR deployments.
One can use the CLI to deploy, manage and delete the eCommerce website example using
several key commands:
1. ancor environment plan eCommerce.yaml – plans the deployment (eCommerce.yaml
is shown in Figure 2.5)
2. ancor role list – lists the current set of roles
3. ancor instance list – lists the current set of instances
4. ancor environment commit – deploys the environment on the cloud infrastructure
5. ancor task list – displays the current progress of the deployment
6. ancor instance add webapp role – used to add a new webapp role instance after
all tasks are completed
7. ancor environment remove production – deletes the current deployment
More options and instructions on using the ANCOR CLI and the dashboard are available
on the framework’s website (https://github.com/arguslab/ancor).
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2.8 Background: Related Projects
A general trend has emerged towards creating more abstractions at various levels of cloud
service offerings. Some of the solutions even use similar terminologies and features as
those in ANCOR. For example, some solutions also use the term “role” in a similar way
to ours,48;70 and others have adopted named channels to describe dependencies in config-
uration files48;50;51. Thus it is important to describe the fundamental differences between
the abstraction used in ANCOR and those in the other solutions, so that one does not get
confused by the superficial similarities between them.
Abstractions used in the various PaaS solutions such as the Windows Azure service
definition schema48 and Google AppEngine YAML-based specifications,49 allow users to
define their cloud-based applications. These abstractions, while useful for helping users to
use the specific PaaS platform more easily, do not serve the same purpose as ARML. In
particular, they only define user-provided applications and not the whole (complete) IT
system in the cloud, since the important platform components are not modeled. Thus these
abstractions cannot be used to compile into different implementation choices or platforms.
They are tied to the specific PaaS platform and thus will never separate the user requirements
from the platform details. Using these abstractions will lock the users in to the specific PaaS
vendor, while ANCOR will give users complete flexibility as to implementation choices at
all levels, including platforms.
Docker container-based solutions such as Maestro, Maestro-NG, Deis,52 and Flynn53 pro-
vide management aid for deploying cloud instances using the Linux containers virtualization
approach. Some of them (Maestro and Maestro-NG) also have environment descriptions
(in YAML) for the Docker instances that include named channels to capture dependencies.
These solutions can automate initial deployment of cloud instances and make it easier to
stand up a PaaS, but they take a different approach and do not provide the same level of ab-
straction that supports the vision outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Specifically, the
abstractions provided by their environment descriptions are focused on instances as opposed
to the whole IT system, the container is the unit of configuration, and maintenance tasks
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Offering Focus Platform
Multiple Cloud
Infrastructures
CMTs
(or similar
technologies)
OpenShift Private PaaS RHEL Yes None
Flynn Private PaaS Linux Yes
Heroku Buildpacks,
Docker
Deis Private PaaS Linux Yes
Heroku Buildpacks,
Chef
Docker
OpsWorks AWS General Ubuntu No Chef
Maestro Single-host Linux Yes Docker
Maestro-NG General Linux Yes Docker
Google AppEngine PaaS Linux No None
Heroku PaaS Linux No Heroku Buildpacks
Windows Azure PaaS Windows No None
Ubuntu Juju General
Ubuntu, CentOS,
Yes Charms
Windows
ANCOR General Any Yes Puppet
Table 2.1: Current solutions comparison
are done by progressing through containers. It is not clear how much the container-based
solutions can help alleviate the long-term maintenance problem of cloud-based IT systems.
We also summarized a few other features to differentiate ANCOR from the other solutions
in Table 2.1. ANCOR can be used to deploy systems using other orchestration tools such as
Flynn and Deis in conjunction with traditional IT systems. As shown in Table 2.1, ANCOR
is currently the most general and flexible management solution available.
Several companies are developing cloud migration technologies. While some appear to
internally use abstractions to support migration,83;84 no details are available for independent
evaluation. Our approach is more fundamental in the sense that we build systems using
the abstraction and, smoother and more reliable migration could be a future product of our
approach. Rather than creating technology specifically to replicate existing systems, we aim
to fundamentally change the way cloud-based systems are built and managed, which includes
enabling dynamic and adaptive system changes, reducing human errors, and supporting more
holistic security control and analysis.
Often, solutions like AWS CloudFormation,85 OpenStack Heat86 or Terraform87 may be,
mistakenly, viewed as being at the same level of abstraction with ANCOR. These solutions
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are primarily focused on building and managing the infrastructure (cloud resources) by allow-
ing the details of an infrastructure to be captured into a configuration file. CloudFormation
and Heat manage AWS/OpenStack resources using templates (e.g., Wordpress template,88
MySQL template,89 etc.), and they do not separate user requirements from system imple-
mentation details. The templates have the potential to integrate well with configuration
management tools but there is no model of the structure and dependencies of the system.
Thus, it cannot achieve one main objective of ANCOR which is to use the operations model
to maintain the system, e.g., updating dependencies automatically while replacing instances.
Terraform similarly uses configuration files to describe the infrastructure setup, but it goes
even further by being cloud-agnostic and by enabling multiple providers and services to be
combined and composed.90
Juju47 is a system for managing services and works at a similar level as ANCOR. It resides
above the CMT technologies and has a way of capturing the dependencies between software
applications (services). It can also interact with a wide choice of cloud services or bare metal
servers. The Juju client works on multiple operating systems (Ubuntu, OS X, and Windows)
but Juju-managed services run primarily on Ubuntu servers, although support for CentOS
and Windows has been announced but is, currently, not widely available.91 While we were
aware of the existence of Juju when working on ANCOR, the lack of formal documentation
on how Juju actually works, the services running only on Ubuntu, and the major changes in
the Juju project (e.g., code base was completely rewritten in the Go programming language)
kept us away from this project.
We recently reevaluated Juju and discovered fundamental similarities between ANCOR
and Juju. Even so, there are subtle differences that make the two approaches work better
in different environments. For instance, the ANCOR approach adopts a more “centralized”
management scheme in terms of deciding the configuration parameters of dependent services,
while Juju adopts a negotiation scheme between dependent services (called relations in Juju)
to reach a consistent configuration state across those services. Depending on the need for
change in the system, the ANCOR approach may be more advantageous when it comes to a
highly dynamic system with proactive changing (e.g., an MTD system).
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Our approach has benefited from the recent development in the CMT technologies that have
provided the building blocks (or “instruction sets”) for our compiler. The general good
practice in defining reusable configuration modules such as those advocated by Dunn70 is
aligned very well with the way we structure the requirements model. Thus our approach can
be easily integrated with those CMT technologies.
Sapuntzakis et al.92 proposed the configuration language CVL and the Collective system
to support the creation, publication, execution, and update of virtual appliances. CVL
allows for defining a network with multiple appliances and passing configuration parameters
to each appliance instance through key-value pairs. The decade since the paper was published
has seen dramatic improvement in configuration management tools such as Puppet39 and
Chef, which has taken care of specifying/managing the configuration of individual machines.
Our work leverages these mature CMTs and uses an abstraction on a higher level. ARML
does not need to mention details on host information such as virtual machine configuration
files or network interfaces, which is taken care of by the CMT and cloud infrastructure.
In particular, ARML specifies the dependency among roles through explicit “import” and
“export” statements with the channel parameters, which are translated automatically to
concrete protocol and port numbers by the integration of the operations model and the
CMT. While CVL does specify dependency among appliances through the “provides” and
“requires” variables, they are string identifiers and not tied to configuration variables of the
relevant appliances (e.g., the “DNS host” configuration parameter of an LDAP server). In
the CVL specification of the virtual appliance network, the programmer would need to take
care in passing the correct configuration parameters (consistent with the dependency) to the
relevant appliances. In ANCOR this is done automatically by the coordination between the
CMT and the operations model (compiled from the high-level ARML specification). This
also allows for easy adaptation of the system (e.g., cluster expansion and contraction).
Begnum93 proposed MLN (Manage Large Networks) that uses a light-weight language
to describe a virtual machine network. Like ANCOR, MLN uses off-the-shelf configuration
management solutions instead of reinventing the wheel. A major difference between ANCOR
and MLN is that ANCOR captures the instance dependency in the requirements model,
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which facilitates automating configuration of a whole IT system and its dynamic adaptation.
ANCOR achieves this by compiling the abstract specification to the operations model, which
is integrated with the CMT used to deploy and manage the instances.
Plush94 is an application management infrastructure that provides a set of abstractions
for specifying, deploying, and monitoring distributed applications (e.g., peer-to-peer services,
web search engines, social sites, etc.). Although Plush’s architecture is flexible, it is not
targeted at cloud-based enterprise systems and it is unclear whether system dependencies
can be specified and maintained throughout the system life cycle.
Use of higher-level abstractions to improve system management has also been investi-
gated in the context of Software-Defined Networking (SDN). Monsanto et al. introduced
abstractions for building applications from independent modules that jointly manage net-
work traffic.95 Their Pyretic language and system supports specification of abstract network
policies, policy composition, and execution on abstract network topologies. Our ARML lan-
guage and the entire ANCOR system adopts a similar philosophy for cloud-based deployment
and management.
54
2.9 Discussion
Our requirements specification approach and the implemented ANCOR framework offer
system engineers the same flexibility as in a typical IaaS model. This means that engineers
can keep their workflow using their preferred configuration management tools (e.g., Puppet,
Chef, Ansible) and orchestration tools (e.g., MCollective). They have the option to do
everything in their preferred ways up to the point where they connect the components
(services) together. For example, system engineers have the option of using predefined
configuration modules and of leveraging the contributions from the CMT community. Or
they can write their own manifests or class definitions to customize the system in their own
ways. ANCOR can leverage all of these and does not force the system engineers to use
particular low-level tools or languages; rather it provides the ability to manage the whole
system based on a high-level abstraction.
The high-level requirements model we developed could also facilitate tasks like failure
diagnosis and system analysis to identify design weaknesses such as single point of failures or
performance bottlenecks. The system dependency information specified in the requirements
model and maintained in the operations model allows for more reliable and streamlined
system updates such as service patching. It also allows for a more fine-grained firewall
setup (i.e., only allows network access that is consistent with the system dependency), and
enables porting systems to different cloud providers in a more organized manner (e.g., one
can take the up-to-date requirements model and compile it to a different cloud provider’s
infrastructure, and then synchronize data from the old one to the new one).
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2.10 Summary
Separating user requirements from the implementation details has the potential of changing
the way IT systems are deployed and managed. To capture user requirements, we developed
a high-level abstraction called the requirements model for defining IT systems. Once users
define their desired system in the specification, it is automatically compiled into a concrete
cloud-based system that meets the specified user requirements.
We demonstrate the practicality of this approach in the ANCOR framework. ANCOR
manages the relationships and dependencies between instances as well as instance cluster-
ing. Such management involves creating and deleting instances, adding/removing instances
to/from clusters, and keeping dependent instances/clusters aware of configuration updates.
The ANCOR framework simplifies network management as system dependencies are formal-
ized and automatically maintained. The current implementation targets a cloud infrastruc-
ture (OpenStack) and leverages the Puppet configuration management tool.
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Chapter 3
A Moving Target Defense Platform
for Whole IT Systems
Our approach of introducing moving-target defense at the whole IT system level is to create
a platform where any component of the IT system can be replaced with a fresh new one.
A component is simply a virtual machine instance or a cluster of instances. We consider
that the MTD approach will be deployed in a cloud environment. Cloud infrastructures
(e.g., OpenStack14 and AWS) made it possible and easy to create bare-metal equivalent
virtual machine instances and networks. Moreover, the cloud is considered more and more
for various types of tasks (e.g., oﬄoading jobs96) involving all types of network devices. It
appears inevitable that IT systems of all sizes are moving towards the cloud — be it private,
public, or hybrid. There are a number of security benefits of such replacements.
• By replacing a VM instance with a new one, the OS and applications will be installed
at the most up-to-date version, eliminating security problems caused by unpatched
vulnerable software.
• If the attacker already compromised an instance, replacing it with a fresh new one will
eliminate the attacker’s foothold on the instance.
• The fresh new instances will have everything installed from a clean slate. The key
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configuration parameters for the new VM, such as IP addresses, port numbers for
services, authentication credentials, etc. can be changed to a new value hard to predict.
This will increase the difficulty for the attacker to re-compromise the instance – the
knowledge about the old system is no longer valid.
• The replacement can happen proactively or be triggered by security events. Mingling
the two will make it hard for the attacker to know whether the attack activities have
been discovered or not.
• When replacement is triggered by security events (e.g., IDS alerts), it is a low-cost
way to deal with potential false positives in such events since the replacement will not
disrupt the normal functionality of the whole IT system.
The above shows that even such a simple maneuver of replacing VMs in an IT system can
have significant benefit on security. However, such simple maneuvers have been non-trivial to
perform. Modern enterprise IT systems have complex dependencies among services, so that
changing one instance alone will almost certainly disrupt other instances that depend upon
it. Thus replacing VM instances must be carefully orchestrated with modifying configuration
settings of the dependent instances. Such orchestration of changes are notoriously error-prone
if done manually. Currently there is a limited tool support to automate this process. As a
result, many IT systems remain stagnant due to the fear that changing them may break the
working systems. Even applications with known patchable vulnerabilities are kept running
for long periods of time until the next system maintenance cycle, which often requires down
time.97 It is even beyond the current capability to replace running VM instances proactively. 1
1 with perhaps one exception, the Chaos Monkey introduced by Netflix98
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3.1 ANCOR-MTD Platform
The ANCOR framework provides a solid foundation for the moving target techniques in-
troduced in this work. Therefore, we leverage the ANCOR framework to build an MTD
platform for whole IT systems.
CMT (Puppet) OpenStack API Library
Processing Module 
(ANCOR Compiler)
MTD System Cloud Infrastructure
(e.g., OpenStack)
MTD System 
Specification (e.g., ARML spec)
 MTD 
Controller
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Operations Model 
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16           int erfac e: [web lb]
17           os: Ubu ntu
18           sam e_imp lemen tatio n: fal se
19    exp orts:
20      htt p:
21        typ e: sin gle_por t
22           pro tocol: tcp
23        num ber: 80
24    imp orts:
25      web app_rol e: htt p
26
27   web app_rol e:
28     nam e: Web  appl icati on
29  num ber o f ins tance s: 3
30  imp lemen tatio n_req uirem ents:
31    def ault:
32      int erfac e: [web app_rdb]
33      os: Ubu ntu
34      sam e_imp lemen tatio n: tru e
35  exp orts:
36       htt p: {typ e: sin gle_por t, pro tocol: tcp}
37    imp orts:
38      db_mas ter_rol e: rw_que ry
39
40   db_mas ter_rol e:
41  nam e: Dat abase  mast er
42  num ber_of_ins tance s: 1
43  imp lemen tatio n_req uirem ents:
44    def ault: 
45      int erfac e: [db_mas ter_rdb]
46      os: Ubu ntu
47  exp orts:
48    rw_que rying: {typ e: sin gle_por t, pro tocol: 
tcp}
Figure 3.1: ANCOR-MTD platform taking an abstract specification of an IT system as input
and creating and managing the corresponding concrete system on a cloud
As shown in Figure 3.1 our current MTD platform is based on the ANCOR prototype, it
targets OpenStack and leverages the Puppet CMT. The implementation can be changed to
work with other cloud infrastructures (e.g., AWS) and CMTs (e.g., Ansible). In this work,
we refer to an MTD system as an IT system deployed and managed using our ANCOR-
MTD platform that supports dynamically replacing instances. The MTD controller is used
to deploy and manage the MTD systems: it can reach the OpenStack API, it hosts the
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Puppet master, and it is able to communicate through the Puppet agents with all instances
that are part of the IT system. The MTD controller cannot be reached from the public
network, so it communicates with the agents over an internal isolated network. Moreover,
the communication between the Puppet master and the agents is encrypted.
The ANCOR-MTD platform takes an MTD system specification (user’s requirements) as
its input and automatically creates and manages the corresponding concrete MTD system on
OpenStack (Figure 3.1). The key feature of the platform is that configuration parameters are
not hard-coded; they are generated at run-time from the high-level system specification. The
operations model stores the computed parameters and can be viewed as an MTD system
inventory — a layer on top of the CMT (Puppet). This inventory captures the user’s
requirements and explicitly documents the dependency among the instances, which nowadays
only exists in a system administrator’s mind. This data is passed to Puppet through Hiera, a
key/value look-up tool for configuration data. Whenever a change happens in the deployed
MTD system, it is also recorded in the operations model. This way we ensure that the
operations model always maintains up-to-date information about the running IT system.
More details about the underlying ANCOR framework are presented in Chapter 2.
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3.2 Instance Replacement
Using the operations model, the platform facilitates a variety of adaptation operations (move-
ments) for the managed IT systems, creating a moving-target defense. When a user requests
an action, e.g., creating new instances, updating configurations, etc., the processing module
updates the inventory and triggers the configuring and provisioning module to perform the
tasks in an organized manner (see Figure 3.1). The processing module is responsible for com-
puting the concrete configuration parameters, for keeping the inventory up-to-date, and for
overlooking the whole process. In addition, every instance in an MTD system has its own
security group,99 an external firewall provided by the OpenStack infrastructure. Security
groups are also computed from the inventory by the processing module and configured using
the provisioning module, to allow an instance to communicate only with instances belonging
to dependent and depended-upon (dependee) instances.
In our MTD approach, live instance replacement is achieved by a sequence of adapta-
tions: adding new instances, reconfiguring dependent instances to use the new instances,
and removing the old instances. An MTD system may proactively or reactively perform
instance replacement. In case the MTD system uses high-availability clusters of services, the
overhead and interruptions will be negligible as detailed in Chapter 4.
Reconfiguring Instances In-place reconfigurations (updated CMT directives) may in-
clude internal service changes such as changing service parameters (e.g., credentials), up-
dating to a new version, applying service and OS patches, etc., or changes that involve
dependent roles (e.g., pointing to updated port numbers and IP addresses). These changes
will be accompanied by security group updates.
Adding or Removing Instances The MTD platform enables the addition and removal
of running instances. Both adapations also involve reconfiguring dependent instances. This
happens through a sequence of tasks and in both cases, the affected dependent services will be
notified using a set of updated CMT directives (see Figure 3.2). When adding a new instance,
the updated configuration directions are sent to the dependent instances (push configuration
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Create or Sync Security 
Group(s)
Provision Instance(s)
Push Configuration to 
Provisioned Instance(s)
Push Configuration to 
Dependent Instance(s)
Delete  old  Instance(s)
Delete  old  SecurityGroup(s)
Add 
Instance
Remove 
Instance
Push Configuration to 
Dependent Instance(s)
Replace Instance
Create or Sync Security 
Group(s)
Provision Instance(s)
Push Configuration to 
Provisioned Instance(s)
Push Configuration to 
Dependent Instance(s)
Delete  old  Instance(s)
Delete  old  SecurityGroup(s)
Figure 3.2: The Instance Replacement Process merges the Add Instance and Remove Instance
operations through a sequence of tasks carried out via the provisioning component and the CMT.
Affected dependent services are notified using a set of updated CMT directives.
to dependent instances) after the new instance was provisioned and configured. On the
other hand, when removing an instance, first, the dependent instances are notified about the
change before the actual deletion takes place. In this way, the MTD system’s functionality
will not be affected during the change process. Moreover, this makes it possible for the MTD
platform to gracefully recover from failures.
Replacing Instances The instance replacement process merges the adding of new in-
stances and removing the old instances (Figure 3.2): one instance or a cluster of instances
may be replaced at once. Creating security groups, provisioning new instances, and config-
uring them are tasks that can be performed in parallel. Once all these tasks finish, the MTD
controller computes the updated CMT directives for all the dependent instances. Dependent
instances will receive only one set of directives that contains all the updates. Therefore, re-
placing one instance, or replacing all instances belonging to a role, will require approximately
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the same amount of time. The new instances may use compatible implementations with dif-
ferent IP addresses, passwords, port numbers, operating systems or application versions.
The roles specified in an MTD system can be implemented in numerous ways, by various
applications and operating systems e.g., web load balancer – installing Varnish on an Ubuntu
instance or Nginx on Fedora can achieve the same objective. As long as Puppet directives
(manifests) exist, they can be included in a role implementation.
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3.3 Threat Model
The threat model covers the in-scope and out-of-scope risks and also the capabilities of the
MTD system to respond to the described threats.
3.3.1 In-scope Threats
In-scope threats are the risks the MTD system can mitigate by increasing the difficulty on
the attackers’ side. The risks range from reconnaissance actions to arbitrary code execution,
and side-channel attacks.
Reconnaissance
Attackers are able to perform various reconnaissance actions (e.g., port scanning) on the
public facing instances, as well as internal probing in case they can gain access to an instance
on the internal network.
Arbitrary Code Execution
Attackers may also execute arbitrary code on an instance. This can occur in multiple ways.
Applications may be poorly configured, misconfigured, or have vulnerabilities that allow
arbitrary code execution with administrator/root privileges on an instance which is part of
the targeted system, e.g., buffer overflow, unsanitized input, arbitrary file upload/execution,
SQL injection resulting in code running on the database instance, etc. Moreover, a privileged
user may be utilized to execute code, e.g., a malicious former employee leaks credentials, a
current user’s workstation is compromised and credentials are leaked, credentials are obtained
using social engineering techniques (e.g., phishing), etc. An instance can also pull and use
compromised code from a source controlled by attackers, e.g., compromised packages.
Arbitrary code execution can result in an operating system compromise that enables at-
tackers to escalate their privileges and maintain their access through backdoors. In addition,
attackers may attempt to pivot through the internal network.
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DDoS Attacks or General Downtime
Applications or the underlying cloud infrastructure may experience downtime due to failures
or because of attackers’ actions (defacement, destruction, misconfiguration, etc.). Attackers
may also attempt to perform denial-of-service (DoS) or distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks by flooding the target system with a huge amount of traffic.
Side-Channel Attacks – Instance Co-Residency
Attackers may gain co-residency with victim instances (perhaps in a similar way to100) and
use various techniques as described in101–103 to infer sensitive information about the target
(e.g., cryptographic keys).
3.3.2 Out-of-scope Threats
Our MTD systems will not provide any additional defense compared to a “static” IT system
when dealing with application vulnerabilities that lead to unauthorized data retrieval and/or
modification: SQL injection, cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery (CSRF), etc.
In case the infrastructure or the MTD controller is compromised, the MTD mechanism
will no longer be effective. This can happen because of misconfigurations or vulnerabilities
on the MTD controller instance, hypervisor vulnerabilities in OpenStack or AWS, and so on.
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3.4 Discussion - MTD System versus Threats
An MTD system will limit attackers’ capabilities to perform reconnaissance actions or to
pivot through the internal network assuming an instance is compromised and controlled
by attackers. The system model is constantly changing, and in case the MTD system is
proactively reconfiguring and/or replacing instances, various parameters must be repeatedly
discovered by attackers: IP addresses, passwords, port numbers, OS/app versions, etc. For-
mer knowledge about the system may become obsolete in a short amount of time. Lateral
movement (pivoting) is also restricted. Security groups allow instances to communicate only
with dependent instances on the internal network (granular rules for specific port numbers,
protocols, IP addresses, and direction – ingress or egress). Security groups are automatically
configured and maintained by the MTD controller. Furthermore, network packets that tar-
get IP addresses or port numbers that are not stored in the system model can be flagged as
suspicious with high-confidence. Performing reconnaissance actions without being detected
may be very difficult, if not impossible.
In order to restrain the effects of arbitrary code execution, the MTD system can be con-
figured to act in proactive and/or reactive ways. Through instance replacement, the patched
versions of various applications and OSs can be installed or a new implementation (different
OS and application) may be chosen. Recovery from credential leaks may be done faster and
with minimal or no downtime using replacement instances with new credentials. Compro-
mised virtual machines can be replaced and persistent access interrupted (especially effective
in case of attacks that succeeded because of a rare event). Using different implementations
in the replacement process may prove efficient in interrupting automated attacks. In the
worst case scenario it will force attackers to put more resources and time to cover different
OSs and applications that implement the same role.
In case of DDoS attacks, the MTD system can be expanded by temporarily adding more
instances in case the Service-Level Agreement (SLA) is violated. The deployment may also
be moved to another infrastructure if the current infrastructure or deployment cannot be
fixed (port the system specifications). However, synchronizing large amounts of persistent
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data might prove to be a challenge. Solutions similar to IBM Aspera’s104 offerings can be
leveraged for moving object storage data. On the other hand, moving block storage data is
more provider specific and the effectiveness is highly dependent on the storage driver. For
instance, OpenStack has more than twenty proprietary storage drivers (e.g., Netapp Unified
Driver, IBM GPFS) and about four free ones (LVM, Ceph RBD, GlusterFS, and NFS)105.
A sufficiently sized cloud infrastructure collaborated with the instance replacement pro-
cess can make co-residency-based side-channel attacks against the instances belonging to an
MTD system very challenging. The instance distribution across physical nodes may change
when instances are replaced. Attackers might need to repeatedly re-locate the new target
instance, gain co-residency, or, at least, re-infer specific parameters about the new instance
in case it is placed on the same physical host.
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3.5 Summary
Our vision of introducing moving-target defense at the whole IT system level depends on
building a platform in which any component of the IT system can be replaced with a fresh
new one. A component is a virtual machine instance or a cluster of instances. Although the
approach can be applied directly to physical hosts, due to the widespread adoption of cloud
technologies, we consider that the MTD system will be deployed in a cloud environment.
Our proposed MTD platform (ANCOR-MTD) is based on the ANCOR framework and
enables users to perform live changes to their running IT systems in an automated and
reliable fashion. Being able to reliably replace instances in a running IT deployment may
have a significant impact on the entire security landscape. It has the potential to drastically
increase attackers efforts and reduce their windows of opportunity at a very low cost.
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Chapter 4
Feasibility and Security Analysis
This chapter aims to show that coordinated changes at the whole IT system level are possible,
and that such proactive changes have security benefits. Two main aspects that reflect the
practicality and effectiveness of an MTD mechanism:
1. Performance and functionality
2. Security
The main goal of this chapter is to analyze, evaluate, and quantify how the operations
supported by our MTD platform affect a running IT system in terms of functionality, per-
formance, and security.
Section 4.1 focuses on testing the performance of various real-world IT systems deployed
and managed using the ANCOR-MTD platform. We quantify the performance overhead that
adaptation operations impose on an IT system. Regardless of potential security benefits, an
unreasonable performance overhead makes the approach infeasible.
Section 4.2 measures the security benefits of an MTD system in terms of the interruptions
it creates for an attacker. Thus, we introduced the attack window concept that can be vali-
dated in an objective way. We are quantifying the security benefits (sizes of potential attack
windows) of using the ANCOR-MTD platform in terms of cost (number of adaptations).
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4.1 Feasibility Analysis
The central intent of the feasibility analysis is to evaluate how an MTD movement process
affects a running cloud-based IT system in terms of functionality and performance. Despite
potential security benefits, an unreasonable performance overhead would make the whole
approach infeasible.
We have utilized “instance replacement” as our movement process because it is the most
resource-intensive operation (including both adding and removing instances) and it also
involves reconfiguration. Our efforts were primarily focused on applications. If needed, large
amounts of persistent data were stored on cloud infrastructure volumes (e.g., OpenStack
Cinder)106 and re-attached to the new instances.
We tested the following hypothesis: The cost of proactive movement can be negligible
if the movement is performed in an organized manner.
The experiments were performed on a private cloud testbed consisting of fourteen Dell
PowerEdge R620 (2 x CPU@2.20 GHz, 128 GB RAM) servers and a Dell S4810P switch. We
installed OpenStack (Icehouse distribution) on these machines using Mirantis’ open-source
tool Fuel.107 The infrastructure consists of one controller and thirteen compute nodes.
We deployed and managed a number of IT system setups based on two different archi-
tectures: multilayered web services architecture (blogging website, eCommerce deployments,
and MediaWiki with Wikipedia database dumps) and a high-performance computing archi-
tecture (Hadoop deployment).
To measure the performance, we used http-perf108 (NPM Node HTTP Server Perfor-
mance Tool) on our deployed blogging and eCommerce systems, and WikiBench109 to mea-
sure a MediaWiki deployment utilizing a Wikipedia (wikipedia.org) database dump.
http-perf runs an HTTP client that launches HTTP requests against a server, while
measuring and recording response times and other metrics. On the other hand, WikiBench
is a benchmarking tool that replays real traffic traces. We ran the benchmarking tools on
the initially deployed scenarios (no MTD operations interference) and established a baseline
for every component in our measurements.
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The baseline measurements are viewed as the control group in our experiments. http-perf
was launched from client machines that were able to access the websites (i.e., connect to
the load balancer). After establishing the baseline, we started replacing instances belonging
to different roles while running the benchmarking tools. It is important to keep in mind
that the way services are configured can greatly affect the performance of an IT system
in general and, especially during the replacement process. In all scenarios caching features
were disabled. However, the load balancer instances were configured to reload the new
configuration without restarting the service. With caching enabled, requests are answered
from the cache and not from the system component under test (e.g., webapp). Thus, there is
little or no impact of component replacement. With caching, performance will be improved
and there will be no performance degradation.
The Hadoop deployment assessment was carried out using Hibench,110;111 a comprehen-
sive benchmark suite for Hadoop, which consists of a set of Hadoop programs including both
synthetic micro-benchmarks (e.g., Sort or WordCount) and real-world applications.
4.1.1 Blogging Website
A basic blueprint of the blogging website is pictured in Figure 4.1; arrows indicate depen-
dencies between clusters of instances implementing the defined roles: weblb, blogging -
webapp, and database.
weblb
database
blogging_webapp
External
Network
Internal 
Network
Figure 4.1: Blogging website blueprint: blogging webapp implemented by a homogenous cluster
of Drupal instances
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Aggregated results from 20 experiment runs
Each experiment run: 150,000 requests sent using 150 concurrent connections
Response time
Total time
Server Processing HTTP Error
(sec) Rate (req/sec) Responses
Avg. stdev Avg. stdev Avg. stdev Avg. stdev
Baseline 0.787 0.040 13min 8sec 40 sec 190.355 10.369 0 0
Replacing
0.793 0.047 13min 13sec 47 sec 188.917 11.195 0.25 0.79
one webapp
Replacing
0.797 0.057 13min 17sec 58 sec 188.206 12.235 13.25 37.57
webapp cluster
Table 4.1: Drupal blogging website – performance overhead of carrying out ONE replacement
operation: replacing one webapp instance and replacing the whole webapp cluster
We used a simple but common design that includes a load-balancer (Varnish or Nginx), a
cluster of web applications (three instances running Drupal)112, and a MySQL database.
Based on the scenario the only component that runs in a high-availability cluster format
is the web application (blogging webapp). Therefore, we chose the web application cluster
(blogging webapp) to be the component that is changed during this experiment (Table 4.1).
All the measurements are averages of twenty experiment runs. Once we collected the
baseline measurements, we started replacing instances while http-perf was running and col-
lecting metrics (Table 4.1). The Baseline column captures the system’s metrics without
performing any replacement actions; specifically the benchmarking tool was performing read
operations on the database. One hundred and fifty (150) connections was the maximum
number of connections our test scenario was able to handle. A higher number of connections
would overwhelm our test scenario and would cause failed requests under baseline conditions.
Next we ran the replacement operations under the same http-perf load to see if and how
much the replacement process delays the requests’ processing (Table 4.1).
It is worth noting that the difference between the baseline and the replacement results
is statistically non-significant, and that, overall, there were no or very few HTTP error
responses during the replacement operations.
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Figure 4.2: Magento: magento webapp implemented by a high-availability cluster of instances
running Magento CE
Aggregated results from 20 experiment runs
Each experiment run: 12,000 requests sent using 120 concurrent connections
Response time
Total time
Server Processing HTTP Error
(sec) Rate (req/sec) Responses
Avg. stdev Avg. stdev Avg. stdev Avg. stdev
Baseline 5.722 0.090 9min 36sec 9 sec 20.833 0.337 0 0
Replacing
5.732 0.115 9min 39sec 12 sec 20.725 0.436 1.25 3.42
one webapp
Replacing
5.763 0.404 9min 45sec 46 sec 20.513 1.520 108.25 163.83
webapp cluster
Table 4.2: Magento eCommerce website – performance overhead of carrying out ONE replacement
operation: replacing one webapp instance and replacing the whole webapp cluster
4.1.2 eCommerce Deployments
Our second experimental scenario is an eCommerce cloud IT system. We used two different
blueprints for this purpose: one based on a well-known eCommerce platform (Magento), and
one based on a more scalable and highly available architecture.
Magento
Magento is a flexible, open source commerce platform that powers over 250,000 online stores
worldwide.113 The blueprint for the deployment is somewhat similar to the previous blog-
ging website scenario. A load-balancer (Nginx) distributes the load (round-robin mode) to
73
the available Magento webapps (three instances) that are connected to a common MySQL
database (see Figure 4.2). The database stores the sample data that is available for Magento
CE (1.9.1.0-1.9.2.0)114. Table 4.2 pictures the results from twenty separate experiment runs.
Disabling the caching features had a significant impact on the overall effectiveness of the
system (only 12,000 processed requests and a very high response time), however the HTTP
error responses rate was less than 1%.
Internal 
Network
External
Networkweblb_role
db_master_role db_slave_role
work_queue_role
webapp_role
worker_role
Figure 4.3: Scalable and highly available eCommerce website blueprint: db master, msg queue
are single instances; weblb, webapp, bg worker, db slave are implemented by a homogeneous,
high-availability cluster of instances
Scalable and Highly Available Deployment
This blueprint adopts a multilayered architecture with the various clusters of services shown
in Figure 4.3: web load balancers (Nginx or Varnish), web application (Ruby on Rails with
Unicorn), database (MySQL), messaging queue (Redis), and worker application (Sidekiq).
Arrows indicate dependency between clusters of instances implementing a role.
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Aggregated results from 20 experiment runs
Each experiment run: 150,000 requests sent using 70 concurrent connections
Response time
Total time
Server Processing HTTP Error
(sec) Rate (req/sec) Responses
Avg. stdev Avg. stdev Avg. stdev Avg. stdev
Baseline 0.408 0.069 14min 48sec 160 sec 168.919 36.924 0 0
Replacing
0.425 0.050 15min 17sec 119 sec 163.577 22.236 1.50 4.66
one webapp
Replacing
0.424 0.047 15min 16sec 110 sec 163.755 18.887 42.60 37.57
webapp cluster
Replacing
0.426 0.040 15min 31sec 91 sec 161.117 16.481 588.10 62.84
one db slave
Replacing
0.439 0.035 15min 55sec 73 sec 157.068 12.320 913.75 113.57
db slave cluster
Table 4.3: eCommerce website – performance overhead of carrying out ONE replacement opera-
tion: replacing one instance and replacing the whole cluster
Each cluster consists of multiple instances that offer the same services. Our test deployment
consisted of two load balancers, three web applications, two database slaves, one database
master, two worker instances and one messaging queue.
The website implements the basic operations (i.e., read and write from and to the
database, or submit a worker task) needed in an eCommerce setup. The baseline per-
formance (Table 4.3) was determined by performing read operations on the eCommerce
website. We focused our efforts on the web application and database clusters. Based on the
scenario configuration it can be challenging and/or meaningless to measure the performance
of other components. For example, only one load balancer will run-at-a-time; the backup
load-balancer instance steps-in only if the main one fails. Furthermore, the worker cluster
and the messaging queue will be circumvented by the web applications, in case they become
unavailable (Unicorn workers will take over their functionality). Furthermore, if the master
fails, a slave may be promoted to act as the database master.
As it can be observed in Table 4.3, under baseline conditions the eCommerce deployment
was able to handle 150,000 requests originating from 70 connections without any errors.
Each request was reading 50 entries from the database. We chose this value based on the
observation that one of the most-popular eCommerce platforms in the world, amazon.com,
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displays a comparable number of items (database entries) on a single page every keyword
search.115 Replacing database or webapp instances can be performed in a comparable amount
of time (within approximately 1 minute of the baseline measurements). Similar to the
previous scenarios, we tried to assess the overall impact the instance replacement process
will have when (for the testing eCommerce scenario) a very high number of requests are
processed. Even though caching features were disabled in both scenarios, the rich content
(mainly images) of the requested pages from the Magento scenario, contributes extensively
to the major performance difference between the two eCommerce deployments.
We performed one-instance and whole-cluster instance replacement on the web appli-
cation cluster, and then on the database cluster (specifically database slaves). The dif-
ferences between the replacement and baseline measurements are, in general, statistically
non-significant and the performance loss is insignificant during the replacement process (see
Table 4.3). When replacing the webapp, there were very few HTTP error responses. On
the other hand, when replacing the database slaves, as shown in Table 4.3, the performance
is slightly impacted by this change and on average 913.75 out of 150,000 requests failed,
amounting to 0.61% of the total number of requests.
4.1.3 MediaWiki with Wikipedia Database Dumps
Unlike the previous scenarios that utilized synthetic workloads, WikiBench is a web host-
ing benchmark that leverages actual Wikipedia database dumps, generates real traffic by
replaying traces of traffic that were addressed to wikipedia.org, and targets MediaWiki,116
the web application used to host Wikipedia. Similar to previous research, Moon et al.117, in
the area of side-channel attacks, we utilized the traces from September 2007 and the corre-
sponding Wikipedia database dump.118 Our setup consists of a load-balancer (Nginx), three
MediaWiki backends, a common database hosting Wikipedia dumps, and one Memcached
instance for synchronizing and sharing sessions among the MediaWiki backends (Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: MediaWiki with Wikipedia database dump: weblb, db master, memcached are
single instances; weblb, webapp, bg worker, db slave are implemented by a homogeneous,
high-availability cluster of instances
Aggregated results from 10 experiment runs
Each experiment run: around 4150 requests (50 threads, 1 worker, max. timeout 200 ms)
Response time
Total time
Server Processing HTTP Error
(sec) Rate (req/sec) Responses
Avg. stdev Avg. stdev Avg. stdev
Avg.
stdev
Diff.
Baseline 0.054 0.001 10min 1sec 0.0003 sec 6.903 0.004 N/A 1.26
Replacing
0.053 0.001 10min 1sec 0.001 sec 6.905 0.006 0 1.12
one webapp
Replacing
0.053 0.001 10min 1sec 0.001 sec 6.904 0.005 +3 1.77
webapp cluster
Table 4.4: WikiBench (MediaWiki with Wikipedia database dumps) – average performance over-
head of carrying out ONE replacement operation: replacing one webapp instance and replacing the
whole webapp cluster (the results for “Replacing one webapp” exclude one outlier experiment run)
In establishing the baseline, we ran WikiBench (replaying Wikipedia traces) on the targeted
MediaWiki deployment. ANCOR-MTD did not interfere in any way when performing the
baseline measurements. Next, we replayed the same trace while replacing one MediaWiki
instance and then the whole cluster.
We recorded the averages and standard deviations over ten different runs (see Table 4.4).
The overall number of errors per se was not our main focus, we directed our attention on the
difference in number of errors between the baseline and the replacement actions. We noticed
that the difference between the replacement operations averages and the baseline is very
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Figure 4.5: Cloudera Hadoop Deployment (CDH5): cloudera compute node is the only service
implemented by a high-availability cluster of instances
small. In case of the one-instance replacement, we recorded an outlier that displayed a much
lower number of HTTP 200 responses than the rest of the experiment runs: 608 compared
to 855, which is the average over nine experiment runs. Including the outlier we would still
have only 27 errors (difference compared to the baseline) with a standard deviation of 90.55
errors.
4.1.4 Hadoop Scenario
We deployed and managed a Hadoop setup using Cloudera Manager119 on top of ANCOR-
MTD. Using Cloudera Manager with our MTD platform, we have deployed the CDH5 version
(Cloudera’s Distribution Including Apache Hadoop version 5) of Hadoop’s Distributed File
System (HDFS)120 and YARN121 (resource negotiator). HDFS is a highly fault-tolerant dis-
tributed file system which provides high throughput access to application data and is suitable
for applications that have large data sets. Moreover, it is designed to run on commodity hard-
ware.120 YARN is a resource negotiator responsible for managing and monitoring workloads,
implementing security controls, maintaining a multi-tenant environment, and administering
high availability features of Hadoop.
Our Hadoop deployment had one master (cloudera master) and three compute nodes
(cloudera compute node), see Figure 4.5. The dns server and the cloudera manager are
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instances utilized to administer the actual Hadoop deployment. Compute nodes are mainly
worker nodes that conduct MapReduce jobs, while the master node orchestrates the job
execution and ensures that compute nodes are processing distinct parts of the data. Using
the Random Text Writer job we have generated a total of 15 GB of data. Next we used
Hibench to launch the default Sort job on the generated data and established a baseline
measurement (Table 4.5). Since a Cloudera Hadoop deployment supports only one active
master at a time, we have focused our evaluation on replacing the compute nodes: one
compute node instance and the whole compute node cluster. When replacing one compute
node instance, the MTD platform was instructing the Cloudera manager about the change.
Therefore, the Cloudera manager was ensuring the addition of the new compute instance to
the Hadoop deployment and the removal of the old instance were done in a smooth way.
We observed the following behavior: If the job started before the new (fresh) compute
instance was added to the compute cluster and the old (to-be-replaced) one removed, then
the old instance was assigned to participate in processing the job. When the old instance is
removed, the data to be processed on it will be relocated to other nodes by cloudera master.
Thus when performing the replacement after the job has started, the “map time” and “shuﬄe
time” (see Table 4.5) were significantly impacted because the relocation process had to
complete before the old compute instance could be removed. As a result the Sort job needed
a longer time to finish. Once the old instance was removed, the fresh instance did not affect
the completion of the current job. In case the replacement process was finished before the job
started, there was no compelling difference between the baseline measurements and replacing
one compute instance (Table 4.5). We have noticed a similar behavior when replacing all
the compute instances (the whole compute cluster). As observed in Table 4.5, a whole
compute cluster replacement after the job started would highly impact the completion time
of a running Sort job compared to the baseline measurements. However, if the replacement
finished before the job execution started, the difference was not significant.
ANCOR-MTD triggered the changes in the Hadoop deployment through Cloudera in an
organized way, by notifying the Cloudera manager about the changes it should perform. The
manager can be configured to act instantly (similar to experiments in Table 4.5) or it can
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wait for certain conditions to be fulfilled (e.g., certain jobs should complete). Therefore,
the performance overhead of proactively replacing compute nodes can be negligible or non-
existent if it is performed before a job starts. Otherwise the performance impact can be
contained by trying to perform the changes when lower-priority jobs are running or during
off-peak times.
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Average Average Average Average Elapsed
State
map time shuﬄe time merge time reduce time time
Baseline 9sec 20sec 8sec 43sec 5min 38sec SUCCEEDED
After
22sec 1min 2sec 3sec 32sec 8min 28sec SUCCEEDED
Replacing job started
one compute instance Before
15sec 19sec 4sec 34sec 5min 34sec SUCCEEDED
job started
After
53sec 1min 36sec 2sec 41sec 13min 21sec SUCCEEDED
Replacing job started
compute cluster Before
10sec 22sec 5sec 55sec 6min 3sec SUCCEEDED
job started
Table 4.5: Hadoop deployment – Sort job on 15 GB of data
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4.2 Security Analysis
In general, quantifying the security of an IT system is a challenging task.122 Quantifying
the benefits of constantly changing a system is even more demanding.12 While there have
been numerous attempts,32;34;35;122 the proposed security metrics are usually at a higher
abstraction level that enables them to capture a wider range of IT systems. Thus, most of
the time, it is hard to validate them in an objective manner on a concrete whole IT system.
We propose to measure the effectiveness of an MTD system in terms of the meaningful
interruptions it creates for an attacker and the cost associated with those interruptions.
Definition 6. An attack window is a continuous time interval an attacker may leverage
without being interrupted by system changes.
Attackers usually exploit somewhat unpredictable occurrences on targeted IT systems
e.g., software bugs, misconfigurations, or user actions. Exploits and other actions may not
have the same outcome every time they are executed. However, in case an exploit succeeds
and the attacker compromises an instance (or a cluster of instances) on the internal network,
his/her lateral movement options (pivoting) would be highly restricted due to the security
groups that are automatically configured to allow ingress and egress traffic from and to
the dependee and dependent instances. Moreover, traffic will be allowed only to and from
the ports stored in ANCOR-MTD’s operations model and attackers may follow only the
dependency paths in order to possibly advance. For this reason, internal reconnaissance
actions on existing or newly created instances can be detected in a straight-forward way
with a high confidence (e.g., any attempt to probe a port that is not in the operations model
can be flagged as suspicious).
Figure 4.6 pictures the eCommerce example scenario with and without leveraging the
security groups. The limited pivoting options constitute an important security benefit if
an attacker is able to compromise one or more instances in the deployment. For example,
if the weblb instances were compromised, an attacker would be able to reach only the six
webapp instances through the internal network and not all the instances belonging to the
other nodes. A node represents a role in the IT system – a single unit of configuration
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that corresponds to one instance or a high-availability cluster of instances. (Here, a role as
presented in Chapter 2 corresponds to a node in the security analysis.)
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Figure 4.6: eCommerce deployment: Internal reachability options
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Controlling the attack window sizes and their distribution indirectly increases attackers’
effort, reduces their window of opportunity, and can be a meaningful way to quantify the
potential security benefits MTD adds to the system. One of the primary challenges is to find
a balance between the budget (number and frequency of changes) and the main objective
(controlling the number and sizes of attack windows).
We have defined the following terminology to describe the proposed model. An attack
attempt is an effort to cause a breach on the targeted IT system. A breach can be viewed as
a set of unauthorized operations (actions) an attacker is able to perform on a node belonging
to the targeted IT system. An attack path may include several nodes that are part of the
targeted IT system. These nodes are:
1. Transparent nodes. The load balancers (weblbs) can be considered transparent nodes
if they just relay a request to an webapp instance without altering it regardless of the
weblb implementation (Varnish or Nginx). Replacing or changing a transparent node
on the attack path will not influence an ongoing attack, e.g., replacing a load balancer
should have the same effect on all requests (benign or malicious) to be passed to the
webapps in the blogging or eCommerce websites (Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3).
2. Stepping-stone nodes. In the eCommerce website (Figure 4.3), an attack on db master
to possibly succeed, usually, requires a vulnerable or misconfigured webapp. Changing
to a different implementation with an updated application and/or configuration will
most likely disrupt the ongoing attack. Thus replacing or changing a stepping-stone
node on the attack path will impact an ongoing attack.
An adaptation point is the moment when reconfigured or new instances start being used in
the deployment. New instances use a compatible implementation with different IP addresses,
passwords, and port numbers. Due to these configuration changes, attacks are generally
interrupted at adaptation points of stepping-stone or target nodes and the attacker must
restart the attack attempt.
A few definitions are needed to determine the size of attack windows in a certain time
period (Figure 4.7 illustrates some sample inputs).
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Tr(X) 
Tp(X) = 64 min
timeline
(min)
0 6410 20 30 40 50 60
ch(X)
d d d d d d
a(X)
Tr(X) = 10 min        ch(X) = 4 min        a(X) = 5 min 59 sec        d(X) = 1 sec
Figure 4.7: Sample inputs for node X
Definition 7. We define Tp(X) to be the period of time taken into consideration i.e., extent
of time when attacks might be launched against node X.
Definition 8. Tr(X) is the interval between adaptation points on node X.
We defined Tr(X) = ch(X) + d(X) + a(X), where
ch(X) - time interval to bring a new instance that implements X in ready-to-use state
(e.g., provision and configure the new instances);
d(X) - duration to change to the ready-to-use new instance(s), d(X) > 0
(e.g., pushing configuration to dependent nodes); and
a(X) - delay to change to the ready-to-use new instance(s), a(X) ≥ 0
(e.g., specifically introduced by the user or by the adaptation strategy).
Definition 9. We define Ta(X) to be the duration of an attack attempt on node X, which is
the time interval when a system should not change in order for an attack attempt to possibly
succeed. In case of a successful attack attempt on a node X, then Ta(X) < Tr(X).
Definition 10. We define Ttarget(X) to be the time an attacker can spend on node X after
a successful attack, Ttarget(X) ≤ Tr(X)− Ta(X)
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Although ANCOR-MTD can provision and configure new instances in parallel, changing to
the new instances belonging to dependent nodes (duration of parameter d for each node)
must be completed sequentially to prevent disruption of communication between dependent
services. Therefore, adaptation points (Trs) of two dependent nodes cannot be fully aligned
(coincide) because a very short delay will always be present between the two adaptation
points. However, because the duration of d was approximately 1 second in our testing
scenarios, we consider this type of alignment as efficient as a full alignment.
One adaptation point does not necessarily create one meaningful interruption for an attacker.
If there are several adaptation points that are aligned (coincide), we consider this as only
one meaningful interruption from an attacker’s perspective. We assume that one adaptation
point creates a meaningful interruption if it is at least one time measurement unit away (1
minute in our case) from other adaptation points. On the other hand, we view an adaptation
moment as one or more aligned adaptation points that create a meaningful interruption.
4.2.1 Adaptation Points Placement
An attack window is a continuous time interval an attacker might be able to leverage without
being interrupted by adaptation points of the targeted node or the stepping-stone nodes on
the way.
Assuming X is the targeted node and Y1 ... Yl−1 are the stepping-stone nodes on the
path to X. Our goal is to determine the lengths of potential attack windows. Therefore, we
start by determining the moments when adaptation points are aligned.
Intuitively, if there are no stepping-stone nodes on the way to X then the maximum attack
window is equal to Tr(X). Moreover, if Tr(X), Tr(Y1), ..., Tr(Yl−1) start at the same time, the
maximum attack window is equal to min(Tr(X), Tr(Y1), ..., Tr(Yl−1)), and their adaptation
points will be aligned (coincide) at every multiple of lcm(Tr(X), Tr(Y1), ..., Tr(Yl−1)). 1
1lcm stands for least common multiple gcd is the greatest common divisor, and min is the minimum.
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If they do not start at the same time, the individual starting times must be taken into
consideration. Thus, the earliest starting time can be considered moment 0, while the
placement of the other starting times captures the difference related to moment 0.
For this purpose let us state the following:
tmin = min(start timeTr(X), start timeTr(Y1), ..., start timeTr(Yl−1))
tX = start timeTr(X) − tmin
tY1 = start timeTr(Y1) − tmin
...
tYl−1 = start timeTr(Yl−1) − tmin
The problem can be defined and solved using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.123 Using
this theorem one can determine integer m that, when divided by some given divisors, leaves
given remainders. In our scenario the given divisors are Tr(X), Tr(Y1) ...Tr(Yl−1) , the given
remainders are tX , tY1 , ..., tYl−1 , and m represents the moment when the adaptation points
are aligned (Figure 4.8).
...
Tr(X) timeline
0
0
Tr(Yl-1) 
...
timelinetYl-1
Node X
(target node)
Node Yl-1
(stepping-stone node)
attack path
tX = 0
m
m
Node Y1
(stepping-stone node)
0
Tr(Y1) tY1
m ...
timeline
...
Tr(X) 
Tr(Y1) 
Figure 4.8: Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem to determine common adaptation points
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Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem we can derive the following possibilities:
Case 1
If Tr(X), Tr(Y1), ..., Tr(Yl−1) are pairwise coprime then:
• Integer m exists and can be calculated
• All solutions for m are congruent lcm(Tr(X), Tr(Y1), ..., Tr(Yl−1))
m ≡ tX mod Tr(X)
m ≡ tY1 mod Tr(Y1)
...
m ≡ tYl−1 mod Tr(Yl−1)
Case 2
If Tr(X),Tr(Y1), ..., Tr(Yl−1) not pairwise coprime then:
If ∀i, j ∈ {X, Y1, ..., Yl−1}, ti ≡ tj mod gcd(Tr(i), T (j)) is TRUE, then:
• Integer m exists and can be calculated
Else:
• Integer m does not exist
Case 3
If Tr(X), Tr(Y1), ..., Tr(Yl−1) are not pairwise coprime (no coprime pairs)
AND ∀i, j ∈ {X, Y1, ..., Yl−1}, ti ≡ tj mod gcd(Tr(i), T (j)) is FALSE, then:
• No pair of adaptation points will be aligned
• Integer m does not exist
Appendix A includes more details for this proof.
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Case 4
If Tr(X), Tr(Y1), ..., Tr(Yl−1) are not pairwise coprime
AND ∃i, j, a, b ∈ {X, Y1, ..., Yl−1},
ti ≡ tj mod gcd(Tr(i), T (j)) is FALSE,
ta ≡ tb mod gcd(Tr(a), T (b)) is TRUE, then:
• Some of the adaptation points will coincide
• Integer m does not exist
Appendix A contains more details for this proof.
4.2.2 Attack Windows Example
To briefly illustrate the options users have when managing their deployment using ANCOR-
MTD, let us consider a possible IT system architecture as pictured in Figure 4.9. Nodes
may be implemented using high-availability clusters of instances or only by single instances.
Replacing one or all instances belonging to a node takes roughly the same amount of time
(Section 3.2). The architecture pictured in Figure 4.9 can serve as a concrete highly-available
eCommerce website (Figure 4.3).
Based on an improved version (with faster replacements) of the concrete eCommerce
scenario, the replacement times for the nodes in Figure 4.9 are Tr(B) = 10 minutes, Tr(F ) =
11 minutes, Tr(E) = 11 minutes, Tr(A) = Tr(C) = 3 minutes, Tr(D) = 3 minutes and
d(B) = d(F ) = d(E) = d(A) = d(C) = d(D) = 1
60
minutes. Tr values are at their lowest
bound for the current environment. In other words, ch’s and d’s are at their minimum and
a’s are equal to 0.
There are two possibilities to reach node E: A, B, F, E or A, B, E (see Figure 4.9). For
the purpose of this example we will focus on the first path, A, B, F, E.
Node A is transparent (corresponds to the weblb in the eCommerce scenario), and thus
Tr(A) will not be taken into consideration. Assuming the replacement intervals start at the
same time, the maximum attack window available to an attacker is min(Tr(E), Tr(B), Tr(F )) =
min(10, 11, 11) = 10 minutes.
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Figure 4.9: Possible IT system architecture. Arrows indicate dependencies and picture the secu-
rity group configurations, light-colored arrows indicate the attack path from Section 4.2.2.
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Figure 4.10: Maximum attack windows over one day
For example, over a period of one day, the MTD system will keep the maximum attack
window for the instances belonging to node E to 10 minutes while in a static system the
maximum attack window can be as long as the whole time period (Figure 4.10).
In the default scenario where adaptations start at the same time, the adaptation points
will be aligned every lcm(Tr(E), Tr(B), Tr(F )) = lcm(10, 11, 11) = 110 minutes. However,
depending on the starting times of Tr(B), Tr(E), and Tr(F ), the adaptation points might
never coincide and the distributions of the individual attack windows may significantly vary.
Figure 4.11 illustrates three possible attack windows distributions over one day (24 hours).
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Figure 4.11: Attack windows distribution over one day with a cost of 407 adaptation moments for
262 interruptions with starting times (0,0,0), 380 interruptions with (0,0,1), and 381 interruptions
with (0,1,6)
To generate these distributions 407 adaptation points are needed in each case. As observed
in Figure 4.11, for the same cost, the outcome may be very different. For instance, 262
interruptions and 26 ten-minute attack windows when starting at (0,0,0) might not be the
best option when a user can get 380 interruptions and fewer ten-minute windows for the
same cost.
In order to increase the number of interruptions while maintaining the same cost (number
of adaptations), adaptation points should not pairwise coincide. For that reason, we can opt
for a set of parameters that fall under Case 3 in Section 4.2.1:

Tr(E), Tr(B), Tr(F ) - NOT pairwise coprime
tE ≡ tB mod gcd(Tr(B), T (E)) is FALSE
tE ≡ tF mod gcd(Tr(F ), T (E)) is FALSE
For instance, by setting a(B) to 1 minute we have Tr(E) = Tr(B) = Tr(F ) = 11 minutes.
Next, we chose different starting times that fulfill the above-stated requirements. For exam-
ple, Tr(E) starts first, Tr(F ) starts 4 minutes later, and Tr(B) starts 7 minutes after Tr(E).
91
In other words, tE = 0, tF = 4, and tB = 7 (see Figure 4.12). Using these parameters, the
adaptation points of the instances belonging to the three nodes will not coincide and the
maximum attack window is only 4 minutes.
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Figure 4.12: Adaptation schedule example
Figure 4.13 illustrates two more starting time options that result in the same number of
interruptions, 393, for the same cost. Furthermore, we have more attack windows of the
same size while the size of the maximum window is also smaller compared to Figure 4.11.
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Nu
m
be
r	o
f	t
im
e	
w
in
do
w
s
Time	window	size	(min)
(0,4,7)	 /	393 (0,4,9)	 /	393 (0,2,9)	 /	393
Tr(B)	=	11	min
Tr(E)	=	11	min
Tr(F)	=	11	min
Starting	times	(tB,tE tF)		/	Number	of	interruptions:
Figure 4.13: Attack windows distribution over one day when no two adaptation points coincide,
with a cost of 393 adaptation moments for 393 interruptions in all three cases
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In case of a successful attack, the maximum time an attacker may spend on an instance
belonging to node E, Ttarget(E), is equal to the difference between the maximum attack
window and the duration of the successful attack attempt, Ta(E). Thus, in the worst case
scenario an attacker may spend between 4 to 10 minutes on an instance belonging to node
E depending on the parameter choices (Figures 4.11 and 4.13).
While there are numerous options for starting times, a’s, etc., a user will always be able
to calculate the cost in terms of number of adaptations. In the following part of this effort
we are aiming at providing an ANCOR-MTD user with some guidelines for setting up the
parameters.
4.2.3 Goals versus Costs
The overall goal is to create as many meaningful interruptions for an attacker as the environ-
ment can afford. The values of the parameters used in the calculation of Tr depend on the
resources a system administrator is able to manipulate for each node. As an illustration, let
us consider the example described in the previous section (Section 4.2.2). The lower bound
in our testing environment is 10 minutes for Tr(B), and 11 minutes for Tr(E) and Tr(F )
with a(B) = a(E) = a(F ) = 0.
In case of node B the duration of ch(B) (provisioning and configuring process) can be
shortened by tuning the software applications’ setups, adding more hardware to the cloud
infrastructure, or by keeping a pool of pre-configured instances for every node. The same
applies to nodes E and F . Pre-configured instances may be rapidly synchronized (if needed)
and made available much quicker than starting the whole provisioning and configuring pro-
cess from scratch. Depending on the size of the pre-configured instances pool, the overall cost
can be significantly affected. In military environments the cost might be justified, however
in other environments it might not be as cost-effective.
Parameter d(B) is mostly dependent on the configuration management tool’s settings
and represents the duration to push the changes to the instances belonging to the dependent
nodes. d(B), d(E) and d(F )’s values are in the seconds range (around 1 sec for each one in
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our testing scenarios using Puppet) while the other parameters are in the minutes range.
Au contraire, a(B), a(E) and a(F ) are the parameters that can be easily manipulated
in the vast majority of environments. These parameters capture the delay introduced by
the system administrator/user. For example, a system administrator can always increase
or decrease Tr(B) by increasing or decreasing a(B). While increasing a(B) has no upper
bound, once a(B) = 0, decreasing the value of Tr(B) might involve a significant cost.
The cost of an adaptation point is quantified in terms of the needed environment resources
and the performance overhead/degradation the environment can withstand (accept). The
environment resources may include the cost for the hardware equipment, electricity consump-
tion, and everything else needed to reach the desired values for the ch and d parameters.
As shown in Figure 4.13, for 393 adaptation points with (0,4,7) starting times, the attack
windows are 3 and 4 minutes long. If we make the necessary adjustments and bring the values
of Tr(B), Tr(E), and Tr(F ) down to 6 minutes with (0,2,4) starting times, it would allow us to
have only 2-minute attack windows. Even though adaptation points will not pairwise coincide
(fall under Case 3 from Section 4.2.1’s), the cost increases to 721 adaptation points for 24
hours. Based on the measurements presented in Table 4.3, and assuming that there won’t
be any errors if no replacement is running, the overall performance overhead/degradation
alone would increase from roughly 1.5% errors in case of 393 adaptation points to 2.75% for
721 adaptation points.
4.2.4 Configuration Guidelines
Every environment has a certain budget – restrictions regarding the number and the fre-
quency of adaptation points. The frequency and the number of adaptation points depend
directly on the size of the Tr values. Once the lower bounds or the preferred values for
the adaptation intervals are known, one can determine the parameter values (starting times
and user introduced-delay) along with the adaptation order by generating all potentially-
interesting options.
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Based on Section 4.2.1, we are proposing a few guidelines to consider when choosing/deter-
mining the parameters:
min Tr = min(Tr(X), Tr(Y1), ..., Tr(Yl−1))
• If tX , tY1 ,...,tYl−1 ≤ min Tr then:
1. max attack window ≤ min Tr
2. the range of window sizes ∈ mod min Tr.
• Parameters that fall under Case 3 ensure that one adaptation point translates to one
interruption for attackers.
• Case 3 parameters with the same Tr values for all nodes usually result in a more
reduced range of various windows sizes. The sizes of the windows depend on the
difference between the starting times of the adaptation intervals.
• Interchanging nodes starting times may also impact the window size distribution.
• The maximum time an attacker may spend on a target node in case of a successful
attack: Ttarget(X) = max attack window - Ta(X).
4.2.5 Attack Attempts
We have defined an attack attempt as an uninterrupted effort to cause a breach on the
targeted IT system. In general, we consider this effort to be meaningful and with a realistic
chance to succeed. For example, blindly launching Linux kernel exploits against a Windows
machine is not viewed as a meaningful attack attempt and might not be considered a priority.
Therefore, when referring to attack attempts we are considering meaningful attack attempts.
As previously mentioned in case of the attack windows, the main objectives on an MTD
system is to increase uncertainty and apparent complexity for attackers, reduce their win-
dow of opportunity and increase the costs of their attack efforts. Attackers usually exploit
somewhat unpredictable occurrences on targeted IT systems and exploits may not have iden-
tical outcomes every time they are executed. Being able to determine and limit the number
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of attack attempts increases attackers’ efforts, helps in determining the appropriate attack
window distribution, and can be a meaningful way to further quantify the potential security
benefits adaptations add to the system.
Being able to calculate the attack windows distribution enables a system administrator
(user) to calculate the maximum number of attack attempts on a node X within Tp(X).
NO MTD. If no MTD mechanism is in place, an attacker might be able to shorten the
duration of an attack attempt (Ta) by learning from previous failed attempts. Therefore,
the attacker will have at least
Attack attempts per Tp(X) = bTp(X)
Ta(X)
c
With MTD. Assuming the following information holds and is known to the attacker:

Tr(X) = Tr(Y1) = ... = Tr(Yl−1) < Tp(X),
a(X), a(Y1), ..., a(Yl−1) are known to the attacker,
d(X) = d(Y1) = ... = d(Yl−1);
while
Y1, ..., Yl−1 are stepping-stone nodes on the path to X
l is the total number of nodes on the attack path
q is the number of nodes that are aligned to create the interruption
An attack is not disrupted when stepping-stone nodes or the target node are provisioned
and configured (during ch(X), ch(Y1), ..., ch(Yl−1)) or during the delay introduced by the
user until a new instance becomes active (a(X), a(Y1), ..., a(Yl−1)). An attack is typically
interrupted when the new instance becomes active and changes are sent to the affected
instances (d(X), d(Y1), ..., d(Yl−1)).
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Therefore, for each possible attack window, the number of possible attack attempts (including
adjacent and stepping-stone nodes) are computed as
Attack attempts per Tr(X) =

bTr(X)− q ∗ d(X)
Ta(X)
c, Tr(X) > q ∗ d(X) (Case 1)
0, Tr(X) ≤ q ∗ d(X) (Case 2)
Tr(X)− q ∗ d(X) is the amount of time the attacker has to launch attacks on X without
being disrupted during a single adaptation interval (Figure 4.14). The disruption happens
when changes are pushed to X or to the stepping-stone instances on the attack path. Pro-
visioning and configuring new instances can be performed by the MTD platform in parallel.
However, changing to the new instances belonging to dependent nodes must be completed
sequentially in order not to disrupt the communication between the dependent services. In
our MTD system, attack paths must follow the system dependency due to the security group
configuration. Therefore the time required for pushing changes to all the nodes on the at-
tack path leading to X is q ∗ d(X), during which time an attacker will not be able to launch
attacks on X.
Ta(X) = 4 min
Tr(X) = 10 min
timeline
(min)
0 10
q = 2; d = 1 sec
2 * 1 sec
Ta(X) = 4 min
15
Tr(Y2) = 5 min
Ta(X) = 4 min
q = 1; d = 1 sec
1 * 1 secTr(Y1) = 10 min
Target node: X
Stepping stone nodes: Y1 ,Y2
Figure 4.14: Attack attempts within adaptation windows
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Thus, bTr(X)− q ∗ d(X)
Ta(X)
c captures the number of attack attempts on X that can be launched
during one full interval between adaptations (Case 1). In case Tr(X) ≤ q ∗d(X) (Case 2), no
attack attempts are allowed. Although Case 2 seams appealing, it might have a significant
negative impact on the functionality and the performance of the MTD system.
Based on the eCommerce deployment example described in Section 4.2.2 (Figure 4.9),
we have the following replacement times for the nodes: Tr(B) = 10 minutes, Tr(F) = 11
minutes, Tr(E) = 11 minutes, Tr(A) = Tr(C) = 3 minutes, Tr(D) = 3 minutes and d(B) =
d(F) = d(E) = d(A) = d(C) = d(D) = 1
60
minutes.
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Figure 4.15: Attack attempts on node E from Figure 4.9
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Similar to Section 4.2.2, we will focus on node E and the path highlighted in Figure 4.9:
A, B, F, E. Based on the guidelines provided in Section 4.2.3, by setting a(B) to 1 minute
we have Tr(E) = Tr(B) = Tr(F ) = 11 minutes, and opt for tE = 0, tF = 4, and tB = 7
(Figure 4.12). Figure 4.15 shows the number of attack attempts on node E. In case of
short attack attempts, adaptations help reduce the number of tries an attacker will have.
However, as the duration of an attack attempt increases the effectiveness of the adaptations
also increases e.g., Ta(E) ≥ 4 minutes, all attack attempts will be interrupted at least once
by the MTD system.
It is worth noting that for static systems (No MTD), the numbers are computed based on
the assumption that attackers do not learn from previous attack attempts. In case of an MTD
system, an attacker will be forced to re-run reconnaissance actions because new instances
will be configured using different parameters (e.g., IP, port, credentials, etc.) – attackers will
not be able to learn from previous attack attempts. Moreover, compromised instances will
be automatically replaced with clean instances as part of the proactive replacing schema.
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4.3 Discussion
In recent years, several researchers have focused on side-channel attacks101–103;124–126 and co-
locating and detecting co-resident instances in public clouds100;127–130. In 2015, Varadarajan
et al.128 and Xu et al.129 concluded that determining co-residency is still possible,131 but
more challenging than just six years before100 due to, in part, the larger instance pools
(more hardware resources) in the current clouds.129
ANCOR-MTD provides users a control mechanism to deploy and manage their IT systems
on a cloud in a automated and reliable way. Instead of relying on the cloud provider, the
user controls the replacement operations and can regularly trigger physical host location
“refreshes”. New instances get new private IPs, application credentials and ports, and can
move to new physical hosts.
The physical host where a new instance is placed depends on the cloud provider’s sched-
uler. While public cloud scheduler rules may differ, Appendix B describes how the OpenStack
Filter Scheduler1 is configured on our cloud infrastructure.
We have deployed on our OpenStack infrastructure the highly-available and scalable
eCommerce scenario (described in Section 4.1.2) with twenty web applications (webapps).
Figure 4.16 illustrates the distributions of the webapp instances on the thirteen physical
compute hosts when initially deployed, and after two whole-cluster webapp replacements.
Despite having only thirteen compute nodes, instances “move” between nodes on every
replacement operation. We noticed that between the initial deployment and the first re-
placement only 3 out of 13 hosts were assigned the same number of instances, while between
the first and the second replacement only 2 out of 13.
Assigning configurable “expiration” dates to each instance will radically change the land-
scape against an attacker. While it might seem that more instance replacements provide
more chances to time instance deployments and thus achieve co-residency (see128), attackers
still have to determine whether the cost to achieve co-residency and perform a side-channel
attack is justified against instances with limited lifetimes (perhaps only minutes). More-
over, user controlled replacement complements existing and future cloud provider mitigation
techniques such as AWS VPC132 and Nomad.117
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Figure 4.16: Distribution of 20 webapp instances across 13 physical hosts (initial deployment and
two whole-webapp-cluster replacements)
Since a replacement operation can be triggered proactively or by security events, it is diffi-
cult for attackers to determine if their activities have been discovered. When triggered by
security events (e.g., IDS alerts), replacement is a low-cost way to deal with false positives
as replacements do not disrupt the normal operation of the system.
The performance loss can be compared in a way to Netflix’s approach to test the resiliency
of their services. They deployed a service (called Chaos Monkey)98 that seeks out clusters of
services and randomly terminates instances (VMs). By frequently causing failures, Netflix
forces their services to be built in a way that is more resilient. ANCOR-MTD terminates
instances during movement, but in a far more organized way.
All scenarios in this work have general-purpose designs and public-facing instances known
to both, benign and malicious users. In other environments (e.g., military), a hidden, possibly
dynamic, instance known only to the benign users may be plausible by using approaches such
as IP hopping. We used public instances because hidden interfaces on public networks are
more rightly viewed security through obscurity as opposed to movement.
We evaluated the feasibility of replacing services and small databases. Since persistent
data is stored on different volume types in a cloud (e.g., OpenStack Cinder, Ceph, etc.),
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attaching the data volume to new instances proved more efficient than synchronizing the
data on each new instance. However, if persistent data must be synchronized with other
locations, IBM Aspera’s104 offerings could be used to move object storage data. Moving
block storage data is more provider-specific (e.g., copying AWS EBS snapshots)133 and the
effectiveness is highly dependent on the storage driver.
Attackers may be able to store backdoor information in persistent data that enables them
to restore persistent access, making the replacement process less effective. Orthogonal re-
search is needed to study the data integrity problem. Nevertheless, ANCOR-MTD addresses
system-level security and is capable of dramatically reducing the threat to current enterprise
network setups.
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4.4 Summary
There are two main aspects that reflect the practicality and effectiveness of an MTD mech-
anism: (1) performance and functionality, and (2) security. This chapter analyzes and
quantifies how the operations supported by our MTD platform affect a running IT system.
For this purpose, we have developed a series of real-world IT systems for the proposed
ANCOR-MTD platform. ANCOR-MTD performs the movement process in a reliable way
with negligible performance (statistically non-significant) overhead. To evaluate the secu-
rity benefits facilitated through the platform, we analyze costs versus security benefits and
demonstrate that an IT system deployed and managed using ANCOR-MTD will increase
attack difficulty. We are able to quantify the outcome (sizes of potential attack windows)
in terms of the cost (number of adaptations), and show that MTD systems managed and
deployed using our platform will achieve the goal of increasing attack difficulty.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
Moving Target Defenses are seen as a way to alter the security landscape by increasing
the uncertainty and complexity for attackers, reducing their window of opportunity and
increasing their reconnaissance costs and attack efforts.
The static nature of current IT systems gives attackers the extremely valuable advantage
of time. Therefore, the Moving Target Defense approach has emerged as a potential new
solution to cyber security. The core idea of MTD is to make a system change proactively
as a means to eliminating the asymmetric advantage the attacker has on time. There have
been a number of MTD-related research efforts such as randomizing IP addresses, executable
codes, and even machine instruction sets. These are important steps towards achieving the
overall goal of moving target defense, but they focus on specific aspects of a system to
apply the MTD idea e.g., IP addresses, code for specific applications, individual computer
architectures. There has not been much research on how to apply the MTD idea at the
whole IT system level.
A whole IT system can be described as a subset (component) of an enterprise network, a
group of one or more machines (physical or virtual) that work together to fulfill a goal. The
overall goal and scope of a whole IT system are determined by the users (system engineers)
and can range from a one-machine service (e.g., FTP server) to more complex deployments
(e.g., multi-host eCommerce websites, Hadoop setups, wiki deployments).
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Applying the MTD idea at the whole IT system level is essential for two reasons. First,
system administrators fight the continual and generally losing battle of monitoring their IT
systems for possible intrusions and compromises, patching potential vulnerabilities, main-
taining user access lists, modifying firewall rules, etc. The complexity and ramifications of
such IT systems, and especially the time required to maintain them, constitute major rea-
sons why errors creep into system configurations and create security holes. Introducing an
MTD mechanism for the whole IT system will support automation of those configuration
tasks and reduce the chance for errors. Second, due to the complexity and error-proneness
in configuring/maintaining a large IT system, once deployed, system administrators are gen-
erally reluctant to change the set-ups. The stagnant nature of the configuration used in the
IT system gives adversaries chances to discover vulnerabilities, find opportunities to exploit
them, gain/escalate privileges, and maintain persistent presence over time. Creating and
employing an MTD mechanism on the whole IT system’s configuration will eliminate or
limit this advantage.
While it seems promising, there has been little research to show that MTD systems can
work effectively at the whole system level and the security benefits can be quantified in
realistic IT deployments. Nonetheless, there are a number of challenges to consider. For
example, there are many configuration parameters one can change in an IT system with
complex dependencies. Introducing random changes will almost certainly render the system
unusable. Setting up an IT system and making it function properly is already a time-
consuming and complicated job. Introducing changes proactively, if done improperly, may
introduce additional complexities. Making a complex system more complex is unlikely to
increase its security. Modern enterprise IT systems have numerous dependencies among
services, so that changing one instance alone will almost certainly disrupt the dependent
services. Changing a system while it is running inevitably introduces overhead, the amount of
which must be carefully examined to determine if the benefits exceed costs. Thus a practical
MTD design must simplify system configuration and maintenance, while introducing the
capability of moving.
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This dissertation presents a Moving Target Defense platform (ANCOR-MTD) at the whole
IT system level based on separating user requirements from implementation details. To
capture user requirements, we developed a high-level abstraction for defining IT systems
(mainly cloud-based IT systems). Once users define their desired system in the specification,
it is automatically compiled into a concrete cloud-based system that meets the specified user
requirements. We demonstrate the practicality of this approach in the ANCOR framework,
the core of the ANCOR-MTD platform.
ANCOR manages the relationships and dependencies between instances as well as in-
stance clustering. Such management involves creating and deleting instances, adding/re-
moving instances to/from clusters, and keeping dependent instances/clusters aware of con-
figuration changes. The ANCOR framework simplifies network management as system de-
pendencies are formalized and maintained in an automated fashion. The current implemen-
tation targets a cloud infrastructure (OpenStack) and leverages the Puppet configuration
management tool.
Our approach of introducing moving target defense at the whole IT system level was to
develop a platform where any component of the IT system can be replaced with a fresh new
one. A component is a virtual machine instance or a cluster of instances. Even though the
approach can be also applied directly to physical hosts, due to the wide-spread adoption of
cloud technologies, we consider that the MTD system will be deployed on a cloud infrastruc-
ture. Our proposed MTD platform (ANCOR-MTD) enables users to perform live changes
to their running IT systems in an automated and reliable fashion. Being able to reliably
replace instances in a running IT deployment can have a significant impact on the whole
security landscape.
There are two important aspects that reflect the practicality and effectiveness of an MTD
mechanism: (1) performance and functionality, and (2) security. To evaluate the platform’s
practicality, we developed a series of experiments on multiple IT deployments: eCommerce
deployments, blogging websites, Hadoop formation, and Mediawiki with Wikipedia dumps
setup. ANCOR-MTD performs the movement process in a reliable fashion with negligible
performance (statistically non-significant) overhead.
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To evaluate the security benefits facilitated through the platform, we analyze costs versus
security benefits and demonstrate that an IT system managed using ANCOR-MTD will
increase attack difficulty. We are able to quantify the outcome (sizes of potential attack
windows) in terms of the cost (number of adaptations), and show that MTD systems managed
and deployed using ANCOR-MTD will achieve the goal of increasing attack difficulty.
One of the future research directions is to construct an adaptation strategies generator
that automatically selects strategies based on the MTD systems’ budget and goals. This
effort may also involve developing a mechanism for incremental recompilation for structural
changes and developing a general cost formula that can be customized for various environ-
ments. In addition, on the implementation side, the OpenStack AWS compatible API could
be leveraged to potentially enable the use of one provider module for various cloud plat-
forms. Future work will also extend and implement the constraint model as an independent
component that may consume ANCOR-independent domain specific languages and generate
various combinations of compatible software stacks.
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Appendix A
Additional Proofs
X is the target node while {Y1, ..., Yl−1} are the stepping-stone nodes on the way to X.
Assuming A,B ∈ {X, Y1, ..., Yl−1} AND A 6= B then
tmin = min(start timeTr(A), start timeTr(B))
tA = start timeTr(A) − tmin
tB = start timeTr(B) − tmin
Tr(A) and Tr(B) are NOT pairwise coprime (1)
tA ≡ tB mod gcd(Tr(A), T (B)) is FALSE (2)
(1)⇒ gcd(Tr(A), T (B)) = z, z 6= 1
In other words
Tr(A) = z × s1, s1 is an Integer
Tr(B) = z × s2, s1 is an Integer
(2)⇒ tA 6= tB
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If m would exist then
Assuming Tr(A) starts before Tr(B), then
tmin = start timeTr(A)
tA = 0
tB = start timeTr(B) − start timeTr(A)
Furthermore 
m = tB + q × Tr(B) ,q is an Integer
m = p× Tr(A) ,p is an Integer
⇒ p× Tr(A) = tB + q × Tr(B)
⇔ tB = q × Tr(B)− p× Tr(A)
⇔ tB = q × z × s2 − p× z × s1
⇔ tB = z × (q × s2 − p× s1)
⇒ tB is divisible by z
⇒ tB is divisible by gcd(Tr(A), Tr(B))
⇒ 0 ≡ tB mod gcd(Tr(A), Tr(B)) is TRUE
⇒ tA ≡ tB mod gcd(Tr(A), Tr(B)) is TRUE
which CONDRADICTS the initial assumption (2)
If Tr(B) starts before Tr(A) then the proof is symmetric to the one presented above.
Assuming A,B,C,D ∈ {X, Y1, ..., Yl−1}
Tr(A), Tr(B), Tr(C), Tr(D)- NOT pairwise coprime (3)
tA ≡ tB mod gcd(Tr(A), T (B)) is FALSE (4)
tC ≡ tD mod gcd(Tr(C), T (D)) is TRUE (5)
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If m would exist then based on the proof above:
tA ≡ tB mod gcd(Tr(A), T (B)) is TRUE
tC ≡ tD mod gcd(Tr(C), T (D)) is TRUE
Contradicts the initial assumption (4), therefore m does not exist.
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Appendix B
OpenStack Filter Scheduler
The latest versions of Openstack use the Filter Scheduler,1 which supports filtering and
weighting to enable informed decisions on where a new instance should be created. Depend-
ing on the employed filters and the weighting approach, the schedulers’ complexity ranges
from simple (basic) to very complex. Figure B.1 illustrates a sample decision process when
using the Filter Scheduler.
Filters
RetryFilter
Availability 
ZoneFilter
RamFilter
CoreFilter
 Host 5
 Host 2
 Host 3
Weighting
RAM
Weigher
 Host 1
 Host 2
 Host 3
 Host 4
 Host 5
 Host 1
 Host 2
 Host 3
 Host 4
 Host 5
Figure B.1: OpenStack sample Filter Scheduler1
The scheduler uses various filters to find the potential destination hosts and then orders
these hosts based on a weighting scheme. For example, the RamFilter only passes hosts that
have sufficient RAM for the new instance. On the other hand, the RAMWeigher is used to
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sort the valid hosts based on their available RAM.
In our deployment, we used Openstack (Icehouse) with the default scheduler options.
/etc/nova/nova.conf:
scheduler default filters=RetryFilter,
AvailabilityZoneFilter, RamFilter,
ComputeFilter,ComputeCapabilitiesFilter,
ImagePropertiesFilter,ServerGroupAnti AffinityFilter,ServerGroupAffinityFilter
ram weight multiplier=1.0
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Appendix C
Ruby ERB/Erubis Template for
Generating an Alloy Model
The Ruby ERB/Erubis template pictured below is used to generate the Alloy model (als file)
that is passed to the Alloy Analyzer. The scenario specific information from the three inputs
is passed to the template through hash table-like Ruby structures (e.g., roles, interfaces
role implementations).
/*
* Constraint Model - Compiling Abstract Specifications into Concrete Systems
*
* Inputs: ARML specification, list of available role implementations
* Objective: Trying to find a compatible combination of role implementations
* that will fulfill the roles defined in the ARML specification.
*
* @author Alex Bardas
*
*/
module constraintModel/dependent_dependee_check
//Roles from the ARML specification
abstract sig Role {
interface: one Interface,
imported_roles: set Role
}
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<% for role in roles -%>
one sig <%= role.keys[0].capitalize %> extends Role {}
<% end -%>
//Interfaces
abstract sig Interface {}
<% for interface in interfaces -%>
one sig <%= interface.capitalize %> extends Interface {}
<% end -%>
//Role Implementations from the list of available implementations
abstract sig RoleImpl {
interface: some Interface,
imported_role_impls: set ImportedRi
}
sig ImportedRi {
interface: one Interface,
ri: some RoleImpl,
imported_ris: interface one -> some ri
}
<% for ri in role_implementations -%>
one sig <%= ri.keys[0].capitalize %> extends RoleImpl {}
<% end -%>
//Populating the roles and the role_implementations sets with the information
//from the ARML spec and the available role implementations list
fact {
//parameters’ order: current_role, interface
<% role_names = Array.new -%>
<% for role in roles -%>
populateRoleInterface [<%= role.keys[0].capitalize %>,
<%= (role[role.keys[0]]["interface"]).capitalize%>]
<% role_names.push(role.keys[0]) -%>
<% end -%>
//Populating role imports
//parameters’ order: current_role, role_1, role_2, ..., role_n
<% for role in roles -%>
<% output = "" -%>
<% current_imports = role[role.keys[0]]["imported_roles"] -%>
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<% for role_name in role_names -%>
<% if current_imports.include?(role_name) -%>
<% output = output + ", #{role_name.capitalize}" -%>
<% else -%>
<% output = output + ", none" -%>
<% end -%>
<% end %>
populateRoleImports [<%= role.keys[0].capitalize %><%= output %>]
<% end -%>
//Building "lattices" using the available role impls (interface name
//is the "supremum")
//parameters’ order: current_role_impl, interface
<% impl_names = Array.new -%>
<% for ri in role_implementations -%>
populateRiInterface [<%= ri.keys[0].capitalize %>,
<%= (ri[ri.keys[0]]["interface"]).capitalize -%>]
<% impl_names.push(ri.keys[0]) -%>
<% end -%>
//Populating Role impl imports
//parameters’ order: current_ri, interface,
// role_impl_1, role_impl_2, ..., role_impl_n
<% for ri in role_implementations -%>
<% current_role_impls = ri[ri.keys[0]]["imported_role_impls"] -%>
<% if current_role_impls.length != 0 -%>
<% for current_role_impl in current_role_impls -%>
<% output = "" -%>
<% current_ri = current_role_impl[current_role_impl.keys[0]] -%>
<% for impl_name in impl_names -%>
<% if current_ri.include?(impl_name) -%>
<% output = output + ", #{impl_name.capitalize}" -%>
<% else -%>
<% output = output + ", none" -%>
<% end -%>
<% end -%>
populateRiImports [<%= ri.keys[0].capitalize %>,
<%= (current_role_impl.keys[0]).capitalize%><%= output %>]
<% end -%>
finishRiImports [<%= ri.keys[0].capitalize %>,
<%= (ri[ri.keys[0]]["imported_role_impls"]).length %>]
<% else %>
<%= ri.keys[0].capitalize %>.imported_role_impls = none
<% end -%>
<% end -%> }
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pred finishRiImports (ri: RoleImpl, no_of_imported_ri: Int) {
#ri.imported_role_impls = no_of_imported_ri
}
pred populateRoleInterface (current_role: Role, interface1: Interface){
current_role.interface = interface1
}
pred populateRiInterface (ri_current: RoleImpl, interface1: Interface){
ri_current.interface =interface1
}
<% impl_param = "" -%>
<% impl_add = "" -%>
<% impl_substract = "" -%>
<% i = 1 -%>
<% while i <= impl_names.length -%>
<% impl_param = impl_param + ", ri#{i}: RoleImpl" -%>
<% if impl_add != "" -%>
<% impl_add = impl_add + " + ri#{i}" -%>
<% else -%>
<% impl_add = impl_add + "ri#{i}" -%>
<% end -%>
<% impl_substract = impl_substract + " - ri#{i}" -%>
<% i = i + 1 -%>
<% end -%>
pred populateRiImports (ri_current: RoleImpl,
imp_interface: Interface<%= impl_param %>){
let ris = <%= impl_add %> |
ri_current.imported_role_impls.imported_ris =
ri_current.imported_role_impls.imported_ris +
imp_interface -> ris
let not_imported = RoleImpl<%= impl_substract %> |
ri_current.imported_role_impls.imported_ris[imp_interface] &
not_imported =
none
}
<% role_param = "" -%>
<% role_add = "" -%>
<% role_substract = "" -%>
<% i = 1 -%>
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<% while i <= role_names.length -%>
<% role_param = role_param + ", role#{i}: Role" -%>
<% if role_add != "" -%>
<% role_add = role_add + " + role#{i}" -%>
<% else -%>
<% role_add = role_add + "role#{i}" -%>
<% end -%>
<% role_substract = role_substract + " - role#{i}" -%>
<% i = i + 1 -%>
<% end -%>
pred populateRoleImports (current_role: Role, <%= role_param %>) {
let all_imported_roles = <%= role_add %> |
current_role.imported_roles = current_role.imported_roles +
all_imported_roles
let not_imported_roles = Role<%= role_substract %> |
current_role.imported_roles & not_imported_roles = none
}
//SoftwareStack stores the solution
sig SoftwareStack {
imp: Role -> RoleImpl
}
<% role_param = "" -%>
<% impl_param = "" -%>
<% i = 1 -%>
<% for role_name in role_names -%>
<% role_param = role_param + ", role#{i}: #{role_name.capitalize}" -%>
<% impl_param = impl_param + ", ri#{i}: RoleImpl" -%>
<% i = i + 1 -%>
<% end -%>
pred findImpl (s: SoftwareStack<%= role_param %><%= impl_param %>) {
<% i = 1 -%>
<% while i <= role_names.length -%>
<%= "role#{i}" %>.interface = <%= "ri#{i}" %>.interface
#<%= "role#{i}" %>.imported_roles = #<%= "ri#{i}" %>.imported_role_impls
s.imp[<%= "role#{i}" %>.imported_roles] in
<%= "ri#{i}" %>.imported_role_impls.ri
s.imp[<%= "role#{i}" %>] = <%= "ri#{i}" %>
<% i = i + 1 -%>
<% end -%> }
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<% imp_ris = Array.new -%>
<% for ris in role_implementations -%>
<% for ri in ris[ris.keys[0]]["imported_role_impls"] -%>
<% imp_ris << ri -%>
<% end -%>
<% end -%>
run findImpl for 1 SoftwareStack, <%= imp_ris.uniq.length %> ImportedRi
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